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Executive Summary 
During the first forty years of its existence, NATO exerted a powerful 
influence on its Soviet and East European adversaries. Even if it is unlikely 
that NATO actually fulfilled its primary task of deterring Soviet attack, 
which the Kremlin never seriously contemplated, it influenced Moscow's 
unwilling allies by providing them with an attractive modelllf partnership, 
subversive of Soviet control. Such a model has been conspicuously missing 
in a region where the historical experiences with alliances have been 
discouraging. 
While the Soviet Union resisted any attempts to reform its relationship 
with its clients by applying the Western model, it belatedly created the 
Warsaw Pact as the ostensible counterpart of NATO in 1955, as part of 
Khrushchev's unsuccessful attempt to make the West agree to a radical 
transformation of Europe's security system to Soviet advantage. Having by 
the 1970s succeeded in persuading NATO to accept the Warsaw Pact as its 
legitimate counterpart, Soviet leaders subsequently sought to use the 
changing balance between the two alliances to pursue their own political 
ascendancy. 
Unable to attain this goal because of the Soviet Union's growing 
systemic weaknesses, by the 1980s Moscow found itself on the defensive 
before an ascendant NATO, bolstered by the Reagan administration's 
military buildup. In response, the Gorbachev leadership attempted to shore 
up the Warsaw Pact by initiating its reform toward a real partnership along 
the Western model. By providing the pressure to convince Moscow of the 
necessity of such an attempt, which eventually caused it to tolerate the 
disintegration of its Eastern European empire and of the Soviet Union 
itself, NATO significantly contributed to ensuring the peaceful outcome of 
the Cold War. 
Despite initial confusion about the possible merits of preserving the 
Warsaw Pact in a different form and the uncertainty about the future of 
NATO, the newly independent Eastern European states handled well by 
themselves the potential threats to their security resulting from the 
disintegration of the Soviet state. Yet despite the unprecedented security 
they achieved as a result, the fallacy of a "security vacuum" in their region 
gained wide credence in the West. By 1994, the Clinton administration, in 
search of a foreign policy success, began to champion NATO's enlargement 
without adequately addressing its likely consequences for the alliance's 
cohesion and effectiveness. 
Instead, Washington responded to the East Europeans' pressure for 
admission by trying to reconcile Russia with the enlargement, which its 
government was in no position to prevent because of its overwhelming 
preoccupation with internal problems and the catastrophic collapse of its 
armed forces. Nor was the widely articulated Russian opposition to NATO's 
plans shared by the largely indifferent mass of the country's population. 
Washington's bid for Russia's acquiescence nevertheless enabled Moscow 
to negotiate the May 1997 Founding Treaty which gave it an opportunity to 
influence the inner workings of the Western alliance against the wishes of 
its members even without a formal right to veto its decisions. 
As distinguished from the political elites, the popular support for NATO 
membership in different countries of Eastern Europe and their people's 
willingness to make the necessary sacritices in order to bring their armed 
forces up to NATO standards have not been as unequivocal as they have 
seemed. Only Poland has shown the consistency of purpose and 
commitment by its government and people alike which, in addition to the 
country's other assets, make it eligible for membership in a class by itself. 
Since NATO's July 1997 Madrid summit, which issued invitations to 
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, new fissures have already 
appeared within the alliance, while pressure has been increased by the three 
countries to continue further invitations, without an end in sight. The 
prospect of NATO's dilution, and its transformation from the still very 
much needed military alliance to an instrument of preventive diplomacy, 
makes the suspension of enlargement imperative. This is the main issue to 
be addressed by the legislative bodies of the NATO states in deciding about 
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the ratification of the radical change of the alliance prepared by their 
governments without proper public discussion of the weighty commitments 
involved. 
In order to minimize the disruptive effects of NATO's enlargement, the 
alliance should proceed for the time being with the admission of only 
Poland as the best qualified candidate. It should leave the possible 
membership of others open for future consideration without the pressure of 
deadlines. In the meantime, NATO should respond to the diverse security 
needs of different Eastern European countries by concluding with thern 
bilateral agreements short of membership, while supporting their gradual 
integration into the European Union as a priority best suited to meet their 
most urgent needs. 
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Introduction 
Approaching fifty, NATO has reached the age of the change of life. The 
body is the same, but something fundamental has been altered. Although 
the alliance, like all things human, could never last indefinitely, suddenly 
this truism appears in a new perspective which cannot be ignored. This is 
not necessarily to say that the peak of NATO's life has passed, but rather it 
needs to make a special effort to redefine its life purpose in order to 
provide a new sense of reassurance. 
Reassurance rather than security has always been the keyword for 
understanding NATO. The alliance was originally created to reassure West 
Europeans against the perceived Soviet threat; only later did it achieve the 
military substance necessary to deter a Soviet attack. But since, as we now 
know from the evidence on the communist side, Moscow never seriously 
contemplated an attack, we do not know whether the security provided was 
real or imaginary. By failing to reassure the enemy of NATO's defensive 
purpose and peaceful intentions, did the alliance contribute to generating 
the very insecurity against which it was meant to protect? These are 
essential questions for understanding security, the meaning of which has 
changed over the course of NATO's existence more fundamentally than 
during any previous period in human history. Within the area of the 
alliance's applicability, though not in the rest of the world, a major war has 
for the first time become all but inconceivable. 
The ambiguous title of this study - Reassuring NATO - conveys the 
ambiguities of the alliance's present predicament that have resulted from its 
past performance. NATO has been eminently reassuring to its Western 
members - the main reason why it has become so attractive to the Eastern 
European applicants who have been painfully deprived of such a feeling. 
At the same time, reassuring Russia, the main successor state of NATO's 
original adversary, about its intentions remains both a challenge and a 
problem. But the alliance itself also needs to be reassured - about its 
purpose, its viability, its very reason for existence. The issue of enlargement 
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has brought all these diverse strains together in a way that makes 
reassurance about the soundness of what it is striving for more urgent than 
would otherwise have been the case. 
The present study seeks answers to these questions by examining how 
the different issues arose, developed, and became what they are. It analyzes 
and interprets the evolution of East European and Russian attitudes and 
policies on NATO. In trying to grasp the politics of the region, excursions 
into history have become fashionable after predictions of its end proved 
premature. Yet in looking at the record, it is necessary to differentiate what 
is important from what is merely interesting, the traditions that are abiding 
from those that are misleading, the facts from the illusions. 
The account that follows first considers the East European experience 
with alliances before NATO was created under the very unusual 
circumstances of the Cold War. It then discusses the convoluted impact of 
the Western alliance on its adversaries, particularly the belated creation and 
troubled course of its presumed counterpart, the Warsaw Pact, compulsory 
membership in which left a lasting imprint on a generation of East 
Europeans and Russians. The important question of what, if any, role 
NATO played in precipitating the surprisinglY easy collapse of its Soviet 
enemy will be addressed to help assess the "security vacuum" that 
subsequently developed in so many heads, if not necessarily on the ground. 
How the drive for NATO's enlargement arose from a desire to fill the 
perceived vacuum is the focus of the central part of the study, with 
particular attention to the elusive reasons why the goal was adopted atier 
having first been evaded. The exaggerated importance attributed to the all 
but unanimous Russian opposition to enlargement is then juxtaposed with 
the remarkably diverse, yet seemingly irresistible Eastern European 
strivings for membership. The resulting rush to enlarge, which led to 
NATO's July 1997 decision to begin inviting new members from Eastern 
Europe, is seen as wrought with the danger of transforming the alliance 
beyond its ability to act effectively. The study concludes with a suggestion 
for how NATO might attain a limited enlargement without risking the 
destruction of the still indispensable Western alliance. 
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fmm the Origil1s of NATO to the Eml of 
the Cold War 
Eastern Europe and Alliances 
The notion that security is invariably and for all time predetermined by 
geography has been one of the more durable fallacies promoted by theories 
of international relations. It has often been invoked in trying to explain East 
Europeans' seemingly permanent security deficit and to justify their need 
for special arrangements to mitigate their presumably immutable 
geopolitical predicament.' Yet the fallacy is easily exposed by observing 
how in Western Europe countries which long faced "historic" neighboring 
enemies - Belgium, Ireland, not to mention France and Germany - have 
eventually attained a comfortable degree of security without changing their 
location. The historical experiences that account for the persistence of the 
fallacy in regard to Eastern Europe therefore deserve close attention ~ to 
demonstrate how drastically its historical predicament has changed since 
the end of the Cold War. 
Lacking sovereignty as nation states, until World War I most peoples of 
Eastern Europe did not have the option of enhancing their security by 
membership in alliances. With the exception of some of the newly 
independent Balkan states, whose pact-building usually had the opposite 
effect, the alliance option was mainly exercised by the great powers, among 
which Russia cast a long shadow despite its reputation as a "colossus on 
earthen legs." Playing the then fashionable game of imperialism, the great 
powers managed their alliances in a fashion that was later widely, if not 
entirely fairly, held responsible for leading to the catastrophe of World War 
I. In this respect, the Russian and Serbian governments could properly be 
singled out for their propensity for reckless miscalculations, although they 
were by no means alone to blame. 
The similarities between Europe before World War I and after the Cold 
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War may at first glance seem disturbing. An international scene again 
characterized by a proliferation of large, medi urn, and small powers 
without the discipline imposed by the two superpowers could be seen as 
conducive to a relapse into the nineteenth-century pattern of rivalry leading 
inevitably to confrontation. Yet before rushing to pessimistic conclusions, it 
is appropriate to set straight what has changed and what has remained the 
same during the intervening period. 
The pre-1914 international order had become widely discredited by the 
time World War I ended with the destruction of some of the leading players 
instrumental in unleashing it, notably tsarist Russia. Having seized power 
there, the Bolsheviks took the lead in condemning imperialist alliances 
together with the whole capitalist system and enunciating the coming of a 
new millennium in which all alliances other than friendly proletarian ones 
would disappear. Although this never happened, the notion of an alliance 
built on ideological affinities rather than power interests continued to hold 
a remarkable sway on Soviet leaders until the end of their state. Indeed, one 
of the astonishing discoveries from their archives has been the extent to 
which those supposed pragmatists were prepared to sacrifice their power 
interests to nebulous ideological aspirations. 
The post-World War I successor states that replaced the defunct empires 
in Europe began to seek security in new kinds of alliances, both with one 
another and with outside protectors. They were handicapped by the division 
between those who wanted to preserve and those who wanted to upset the 
international order created by the 19 I 9 peace settlement. Nor did the 
affiliation of their respective groupings with such unreliable patrons as 
France and Italy, ever inclined to pursue their own interests at the expense 
of their clients, help the credibility of those alliances. The self-imposed 
exclusion of the United States from the European security system and the 
lukewarm commitment to it of the still respectable British power have 
rightly been remembered as its fatal flaws. 
The Poles particularly remember that in 1920 they defeated the invading 
Soviet Red Army without foreign help, although their French military 
advisers, whose expertise was not needed, retrospectively raised specious 
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claims about their contribution to victory. France. which would have much 
preferred a renewed alliance with Russia if only its new rulers had been 
agreeable. was similarly reluctant to provide effective security guarantees 
to its other East Central European clients: Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and 
Romania. They together formed the Little Entente, masterminded by the 
region's most active propunent of alliance politics, Czechoslovak president 
Edvard Benes, against the far from overwhelming threat of the truncated 
Hungary, the only enemy the three had in common. The Little Entente 
offered no protection against their more formidable adversaries - Germany, 
Italy, and the Soviet Union. In any case, the alliance did not spell out 
military obligations. Neither did the stilllaoser Balkan Union between 
Yugoslavia, Romania, Greece, and Turkey. 
The story of how Eastern Europe's alliances, not to speak of the League 
of Nations' ineffectual peace enforcement mechanism, failed to protect 
against Fascist aggression in the nineteen-thirties has often been told. What 
has not been stated often enough is how different Europe is today from the 
time when its anemic democracies, vainly groping for a way out of the 
depth of the Great Depression, seemed in full retreat before charismatic 
dictators ready to use force in pursuit of ever-expanding ambitions. So 
extraordinary was the setting that the nineteen-thirties could hardly provide 
any lessons of universal validity. Yet the decade proved a fertile breeding 
ground for myths, some of which have ever since distorted East European 
and Russian thinking about alliances. 
Prominent among the myths has been that of the "Munich betrayal" of 
Czechoslovakia said to have been perpetrated by the British and the French 
in 1938. Despicable as their behavior was, only France had alliance 
obligations toward the Czechs while the British appeasement of Hitler 
merely intluenced French willingness, or rather unwillingness, to act - a 
distinction often ignored even by security experts" Although Prague never 
made plans to defend the country without foreign help, Czech governments 
have been able to capitalize on Western feelings of guilt by alleging the 
West's moral debt to East Europeans and demanding better security 
guarantees. 
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Another myth, favored especially by the Left, has been that "collective 
security" equaled real security. It presumes that the Soviet Union was ready 
to act against Hitler along with the Western powers if only these wanted to, 
whereas Stalin rather preferred a deal with the congenial Nazi dictator if 
only Hitler wanted to, and in the end got his wish. The collective security 
promoted by Moscow merely entailed consultation about common action 
without military obligations - another key distinction frequently lost in 
current debates about Europe's desirable "security architecture." 
Since Czechoslovakia had an alliance with Moscow but in 1938 chose 
not to activate it, communists were able to cultivate the myth that the Soviet 
Union was the only reliable ally. In fact, Stalin in his quest for security 
sought loosely formulated "friendship" treaties with weaker countries that 
would allow the stronger Soviet side to interpret the terms to its advantage. 
He was particularly interested in the "right" to intervene by sending troops 
into neighboring territories whenever, in his opinion, Soviet security might 
be threatened. There was nothing attractive in his concept of alliances for 
anyone but him. 
Apart from the Stalin-Hitler pact of 1939 which, having precipitated 
World War n, provided the long-term basis for Soviet domination of 
Eastern Europe, other alliance commitments also proved dangerous for the 
East Europeans. The belated British attempt to deter German aggression by 
proclaiming a guarantee of Poland's integrity had the opposite effect. It has 
since been remembered as a textbook example of a rash security pledge 
made without proper consideration of its military consequences. Nor did its 
verbal extension to several Balkan countries enhance its credibility. 
During World War n the East Europeans' record as allies was mixed. At 
its beginning, Poland succumbed within four weeks despite the bravery of 
its underequipped and overconfident army. So did Yugoslavia, whose 
armed forces collapsed within a few days, although the Serbs preserved a 
reputation for invincibility which held outsiders in awe until as late as 
1995, when it was deflated by NATO in Bosnia. Of Britain's other wartime 
allies in the region, the Greeks alone put up impressive military resistance, 
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if only against the less than formidable army of Mussolini's Italy. Yet once 
the war became global, Polish and, in lesser numbers, Czechoslovak units 
fought valiantly as part of both the British and the Soviet armed forces. 
The Czechoslovak and Polish units were the only ones from the region 
that fought on the Allied side from the beginning to the end. Otherwise, 
apart from the Yugoslav guerrillas operating independently on their home 
ground, Eastern European armies were German allies, though not 
particularly valuable oneS. While Hitler professed admiration for the 
military prowess of the Romanian forces under the dictator Ion Antonescu, 
the Soviets who encountered them at the front were not so impressed. Nor 
did Moscow rate highly Hitler's Hungarian and Slovak allies, and it did not 
give a chance to the reportedly competent Bulgarian army to prove itself 
before it was paralyzed as a result of the communist-backed coup in the 
country's capital. Indisputably the best fighting force in the area was the 
Finnish army, which earned Stalin's respect by inflicting heavy casualties 
on his invading troops in 1939-40 and subsequently keeping distance from 
Germany as its co-belligerent but not formal ally. 
All things considered, the experience of World War II cast grave doubts 
about the value of alliances in safeguarding Eastern Europe's security. After 
the abortive projects by the governments-in-exile of Polish-Czechoslovak 
and Yugoslav-Greek confederations, neither of which envisaged military 
provisions, the Western powers abstained from promoting alliance-building 
in the region. Instead they relied on the American concept of the United 
Nations, which allowed for the creation of subsidiary regional alliances, as 
the main guarantor of peace and stability throughout the world. Yet the tacit 
Western acceptance of Moscow's leading role in organizing Eastern Europe 
left the security arrangements there in Stalin's hands. 
It was not the Soviet dictator, however, but Czechoslovak president 
Benes who in 1943 took the initiative which subsequently led to the 
formation of Moscow's network of bilateral treaties of "friendship and 
mutual assistance" throughout the part of Europe that became its sphere of 
influence, Intent to establish his country's position as the most favored 
Soviet ally, Benes proposed the kind of a vague, open-ended document 
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Stalin preferred. Although the Soviet leader was initially not in a hurry to 
sign a treaty with Czechoslovakia, he began insisting on its quick 
conclusion once the British had signaled their desire to postpone the 
signature until the end of the war. Moscow hinted that the Czechoslovak-
Soviet treaty was a possible model for Italy as well as France, but in the end 
Stalin applied the formula only to the countries he was able to control. 
In the immediate postwar period, the treaties served Stalin as a more 
important instrument of control than they may seem to have been in 
retrospect. At a time when the imposition of Soviet-style communist 
regimes throughout the area was not yet a foregone conclusion in his mind, 
they were the main expression of Moscow's special relationship with its 
client states. Accordingly, Stalin assigned a high priority to preventing 
those states from concluding similar treaties with other countries or with 
each other, thus keeping them both isolated and divided. 
Stalin's interventions to that effect marked important stages in the 
growth of the Soviet empire and the developing partition of Europe. In July 
1947, he personally blocked Czechoslovakia's attempt to supplement its 
a11iance with Moscow by a renewal of its prewar treaty with France. He 
vetoed the project at the same meeting with the delegation of the Prague 
government where he also compelled it to cancel its previously announced 
decision to participate in the conference where the Marshall Plan was to be 
inaugurated - a critical turning point in the Cold War.' 
Six months later, Stalin intervened to counteract the mutual defense 
treaties he had previously allowed Yugoslavia's communist chief Josip Broz 
Tito to conclude with his neighbors - Albania, Hungary, Romania, 
Bulgaria. Those treaties included a clause that could be construed as being 
directed not only against a possible German threat but also against the 
United States. Loath to provoke deeper American involvement in the 
Balkans, where Washington had recently extended support to the Greek 
government in its war against communist guerrillas, Stalin quickly 
summoned representatives of Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, and forced 
them to sign bilateral treaties that conspicuously omitted the provocative 
clause.of 
18 DEFENCE STUDIES 511997 
Another important time when alliance-building was at issue came in 
February 1948 when Stalin, having accelerated confrontation with the 
West, began to suffer setbacks. In trying to tie Finland more closely to the 
Soviet Union, he demanded that it sign the same kind of a "friendship" 
treaty that tied to Moscow its already subjugated Eastern European 
dependencies. Yet six weeks later, after Western indignation about the 
communist coup in Czechoslovakia had led to further Soviet political 
losses in Western Europe, Stalin accepted a different kind of alliance, one 
which allowed the Finns to preserve enough of their independence to be 
left outside of the Soviet bloc.' 
Yet it was understood that Finland, much less any of the Eastern 
European countries by then already controlled by communists, must not 
ally itself with the West. This was all the more important since the West's 
own military alliance was now in the making, which was bound to give the 
Cold War an entirely new dimension. At this critical juncture, the alliances 
Stalin had been building in his part of Europe were of little use to prevent 
the establishment of the Western one, nor were they sufficient any longer to 
serve as the glue that would hold his empire together. Having never met the 
true security needs of the people of the region, the "friendship treaties" 
were not even relevant for their new communist rulers, whose 
unconditional submission to Moscow now provided the glue. In contrast, 
the emerging Western alliance - NATO - came to signify for the other part 
of Europe the crucial safeguard of its territorial integrity and political 
pluralism under American protection. The challenge that this novel alliance 
posed to Moscow and its unwilling allies determined in fundamental ways 
the entire subsequent course of the Cold War. 
Enter NATO 
Consistent with its belief in a hostile capitalist encirclement, the Soviet 
Union had suspected the West was building a military bloc against it long 
before NATO came into existence. Regarding especially the Marshall Plan 
as a design to mobilize Western Europe for a military confrontation, Stalin 
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considered all attempts at the recovery and unification of the region as 
subversive of his concept of security, which required weakness and division 
among all actual and possible Soviet adversaries. Nor was the dictator 
mentally equipped to grasp the voluntary nature of the partnership of the 
Western democracies. Imputing the United States with the same readiness 
to impose its will upon weaker countries that characterized his own style of 
running an empire, he regarded NATO as a mere instrument of American 
domination rather than an entity in its own right. 
After last-minute Soviet maneuvers to derail the Western alliance by 
threats and blandishments had failed, Stalin did not respond to its 
proclamation in April 1949 as vigorously as he could have done. Since 
NATO was at this early stage little more than a diplomatic framework 
without military substance, Stalin was primarily concerned with its long-
term potential in the event of war. And since he judged the probability of 
war to have decreased as a result of his decision to defuse the crisis he had 
created the year before by imposing the Berlin blockade, he did not deem it 
necessary to alter the already established system of bilateral military 
alliances that tied the Soviet bloc together or even significantly to step up 
its military preparedness. Neither was the long-term prospect necessarily 
alarming if the "general crisis of capitalism" that Moscow believed 
imminent could delay indefinitely the "inevitable" war which, according to 
Marxist writ, was inherent in the capitalist system. 
Rather than in preparing for war, the Soviet dictator therefore sought 
security in the further consolidation of his realm, which in his terms 
presupposed more ruthless repression of real or imaginary internal enemies 
and required more thorough SUbjugation of the peoples of Eastern Europe. 
He rightly saw Western ideological subversion and covert operations as 
more dangerous to his totalitarian aspirations than was Western military 
power, especially after the Soviet Union had begun to checkmate that 
power by developing its own nuclear arsenal. Yet the situation changed to 
Moscow's disadvantage once the communist aggression Stalin permitted to 
be launched in Korea in June 1950 prompted in Europe a Western reaction 
that gave NATO the military substance it had been thus far lacking. 
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By early 1951 Stalin panicked. He summoned top East European party 
and army leaders to Moscow and ordered them to not only put their 
economies on war footing but also prepare for offensive military action 
against NATO, presumably to pre-empt its expected attack" From 
intelligence reports about the alliance's December 1950 meeting, Moscow 
concluded that "in connection with their failures in Korea the Americans 
apparently intend to provoke in the summer of 1951 a military conflict in 
Eastern Europe with the goal of seizing the eastern zone of Austria. To 
realize this goal, the Americans intend to utilize Yugoslavia.'" 
Besides the rapid expansion of NATO's military capability, Stalin 
viewed the proposed inclusion in it of West Germany with particular 
foreboding because of the exaggerated notions he entertained about the 
proverbial German efficiency and military competence. He tried 
assiduously to prevent the rearmament of West Germany, believing that 
Bonn would inevitably gain control of the alliance and use it to 
aggressively pursue the reunification of the country. with dire consequences 
for the integrity of his Eastern European empire. Underestimating the 
strength of the bonds that held NATO together despite the frequent 
bickering among its members, he repeatedly tried to exploit their discord, 
only to see them close their ranks and strengthen the alliance. He never 
reconciled the Marxist dogma that posits an increasingly bitter competition 
between capitalists of different countries with his belief in their anti-Soviet 
conspiracy. Hence also he could not possibly grasp the role NATO played 
in helping its members, notably the Germans and the French, to overcome 
their national prejUdices. 
Stalin's successors were initially reluctant to modify his ineffectual 
NATO policies. They reduced their own military expenditures but were 
unable to stop the growth of the Western alliance. In a desperate move, in 
1954 Soviet foreign minister Viacheslav M. Molotov challenged NATO to 
prove its peaceful intentions by agreeing to admit any country that wanted 
to join, including the Soviet Union. His posturing inaugurated a Soviet 
campaign for a new European security system which, accelerated after the 
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conclusion later that year of the Paris agreements setting the date for West 
Germany's membership in NATO, marked Moscow's reassessment of the 
value of alliances. 
The campaign for a new European security system, promoted by party 
general secretary Nikita S. Khrushchev after his rise to supreme power in 
early 1955 as pan of his revision of Soviet security policy, was intended to 
put the West on the run by demilitarizing the Cold War. After NATO had 
begun to install tactical nuclear arms in Europe to offset its inferiority in 
conventional forces, Khrushchev sought to neutralize the West's overall 
superiority in nuclear weapons by accelerating both real and pretended 
Soviet development of these increasingly destructive weapons. At the same 
time, he scaled down his country's more usable conventional forces, thus 
reducing the incentive for an East-West military showdown. He banked on 
the Soviet ability to outperform the West in non-military competition, 
firmly believing that the Soviet system was politically, economically, and 
ideologically superior to the capitalist adversary. 
Against the background of Moscow's promotion of a European 
collective security system at a time of diminishing international tension, the 
establishment in May 1955 of the Warsaw Pact as the Soviet bloc's own 
military alliance may seem baffling. The official explanation that the 
organization was needed to counter the threat posed by West Germany's 
recent admission into NATO could hardly be reconciled with the Soviet 
reluctance to put substance into the new alliance. Presented by Moscow to 
its Eastern European dependents at short notice for their signature without 
their consultation, the pact included a secret annex singling out the military 
contingents the signatories would be required to contribute, but did not 
provide for the creation of the appropriate joint institutions. These would in 
any case have been superfluous given the Soviet Union's effective control 
of the military potential of its vassal states through political domination and 
the bilateral treaties that had been in existence since the onset of the Cold 
War. 
Having drawn up the Warsaw treaty to mirror the founding document of 
NATO, Moscow proceeded to propose the dissolution of both ostensibly 
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equivalent alliances, which would deprive Western Europe of the only one 
it had while leaving the Soviet network of bilateral treaties intact. The 
Soviet Union could then expect to dominate what it envisaged as Europe's 
new "collective" security system, from which the United States would be 
excluded. Only Khrushchev's illusions as a Marxist true believer could 
possibly justify his belief that the West would seriously entertain such an 
unfavorable deal. He assumed that NATO's current ascendancy could be 
reversed to arrive at a situation which would somehow make it possible to 
convince the capitalist leaders that they had no choice but to accept the 
Soviet terms. 
As the Soviet bid for the dismantling of alliances faltered, the Warsaw 
Pact marked time searching for a purpose. No building up of its institutions 
followed the establishment in 1956 of its political consultative committee 
and joint military staff. The committee, consisting of high-level 
representatives of the member states meeting at most once a year, served 
mainly to give an appearance of collegiality to Khrushchev's assorted 
diplomatic initiatives. And the joint staff under a Soviet general was 
initially used for little more than making Moscow's sometimes reluctant 
allies follow its example in reducing their armed forces as required by its 
new security design. 
In March 1956, Khrushchev told visiting Danish Prime Minister Hans-
Christian Hansen that "we proved our peace-loving nature, and will 
continue to prove it. Thereby we shall shake NATO loose. We will continue 
to reduce armed forces unilaterally [ ... ] [and] you will find it hard to justify 
NATO before public opinion.'" In seeking a military disengagement that 
would eventually compel the West to negotiate away both alliances and 
replace them with an all-European security system guaranteed by Moscow, 
the Soviet Union targeted especially the Nordic countries. It urged Norway 
and Denmark to follow the Austrian or Finnish models of neutrality and 
entrust national security to bilateral arrangements with Moscow. The 
withdrawal without any quid pro quo of Soviet forces from the Porkkala-
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Vdd base in Finland impressed the Icelandic parliament sufficiently to 
demand, albeit in vain, a similar closure of the U.S. air force base at 
Keflavik, the provision of which was Iceland's main contribution to NATO. 
While the Soviet probes did not seriously affect the unity of the Western 
alliance - or the extent of disunity it always showed - NATO exerted a 
disruptive influence on Moscow's own allies. Shortly before the Soviet 
suppression of the Hungarian uprising in November 1956, the Polish 
general staff had established a special commission to propose an overhaul 
of the Warsaw Pact with the goal of making it closer to the partnership 
exemplified by its Western counterpart. The commission produced a 
memorandum which questioned the authority of the Soviet-appointed 
supreme commander of the alliance over the armed forces of its member 
states, insisting that his term be limited and that in peacetime the national 
contingents be subordinated exclusively to their respective governments. A 
commentary by chief of operations Gen. Jan Drzewiecki criticized as 
illegal Moscow's imposition of the Warsaw Pact without approval by any 
representati ve bodiesY 
The proposal was shelved after the Soviet commander whuse powers it 
intended to curtail, Marshal Ivan S. Konev, took personal offense at the 
daring of the attempt. "What do you imagine to be doing," he exploded, 
"making us set up a NATO here?"'" Still, having referred to NATO's 
arrangements with V.S. forces as models, Poland at least won a favorable 
agreement which regulated the status of the Soviet troops stationed on its 
territory differently from other parts of Eastern Europe. Even though the 
provision subordinating the troops to Polish rather than to Soviet law was 
ignored in practice, the agreement amounted to Moscow's recognition of 
the country's special position within the Soviet bloc." It did not discourage 
Polish officers from proceeding, even if not succeeding, with a project to 
create within the Warsaw Pact a separate "Polish front" that would remain 
the nation's exclusive area of operations,12 
Although the Warsaw Pact did not fulfill its purpose of prodding the 
West to start negotiations about the European security system Moscow 
wanted, until 1958 Khrushchev continued to use its meetings to at least put 
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on record his undiminished desire for the dissolution of both the bogus 
Soviet alliance and the real Western one. Until the end of his rule six years 
later, he kept advancing the proposal for a non-aggression pact between the 
two alliances. The time and effort invested in promoting this verbal 
declaration would seem worthy of a better cause if Khrushchev had not 
seen it as a public relations venture to blunt NATO's anti-Soviet thrust by 
bringing about "psychological improvement" in the relations between East 
and West. J] 
Moscow was alert to any signs of deepening disagreements between the 
Americans and their European allies that could make such an 
"improvement" possible. It was at most times well informed about NATO's 
internal affairs - mainly through West German channels - and habitually 
magnified the discord in the enemy camp by wishful thinking. In the spring 
of 1958, Soviet intelligence intercepted a message by Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles to U.S. ambassadors in which Dulles expressed his 
concern about the constancy of the NATO partners' commitment to the 
common values and their readiness to stand up to the Soviet Union." Soon 
afterward Khrushchev began to test their solidarity by provoking in 
Germany the crisis that three years would backfire by forcing him to build 
the Berlin Wall. 
In trying to intimidate the West Europeans by expatiating on the dire 
consequences for themselves of a nuclear war to which they might be 
drawn by their American ally, Khrushchev underestimated NATO's 
capacity to hold together under pressure. In the West his threats were 
rightly discounted as bluff and bluster, but the Soviet military took more 
seriously what they regarded as the necessity to prepare for the possibility 
of having to fight a nuclear war against NATO. The task promised to 
compensate for the diminished role Khrushchev assigned to the 
conventional forces in his attempted revision of Soviet security policy, an 
initiative now in suspense because of his failure to obtain by non-military 
means the desired Western concessions in Germany. But the upsurge of 
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international tension during the Berlin crisis also provided a suitable setting 
to give the Warsaw Pact the missing military dimension, thus making it a 
more credible counterpart of NATO. 
The joint maneuvers, introduced as a new feature of the Soviet-led 
alliance shortly after the Berlin Wall went up in 1961, were calculated to 
bolster Moscow's authority among its allies, recently shaken by the 
embarrassing defection of the smallest of them, Albania, and to impress the 
West with the Warsaw Pact's military prowess. Its well-publicized first joint 
maneuvers, code named Tempest, coincided with a supersecret exercise at 
the headquarters of the Soviet forces in Germany at WUnsdorf near Berlin. 
Under the guidance of top Soviet generals, its Eastern European 
participants designed there plans for the invasion of Western Europe as far 
as the Pyrenees, English Channel and North Sea during which atomic and 
hydrogen bombs were to be liberally used to destroy major cities." 
There was a make-believe quality about these exercises, described by 
one of the Polish participants as "childlike" games at a war in which next to 
nothing could be reliably predicted." Presuming its initiation by NATO's 
massive nuclear strike without warning, they enacted a counteroffensive 
miraculously bringing the enemy to his knees in a few days.17 As if 
protected by divine providence, the victorious troops would then march 
unscathed into the radioactive ruins of the Western cities, within hours of 
their destruction. In directing the WUnsdorf exercise, the future supreme 
commander of the Warsaw Pact, Marshal Ivan Iakubovskii, mistook 
Luxembourg for the Belgian capital, while Polish airborne and amphibious 
units were assigned to descend on the Danish island of Bornholm although 
they were not equipped with the landing craft needed for the operation. 
The scary Soviet war games, given a touch of plausibility by the narrow 
escape from a nuclear clash during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, prompted 
at least one Warsaw Pact government to reduce the risks inherent in 
membership in the alliance by approaching the enemy. In October 1963, 
Romanian foreign minister Corneliu Manescu secretly passed the word to 
the United States that in case of a nuclear confrontation involving the 
Soviet Union his country would remain neutral - a message sensational 
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enough not to be shared by Washington even with its closest allies." As 
Khrushchev's position weakened, Romania sought to loosen its ties with the 
Warsaw Pact by adopting in April 1964 his earlier call for the simultaneous 
abolition of both of Europe's alliances." Later that year, Bucharest 
promptly took advantage of Khrushchev's faB from power to bar Warsaw 
Pact maneuvers on its territory, reduce the size of the Soviet military 
mission there, and revive the earlier Polish proposal for the rotation of the 
alliance's supreme command among its member states. 
Khrushchev's successors gratified the Soviet military by reversing his 
army reductions and placing renewed emphasis on the conventional forces, 
without slowing down the development of the nuclear ones. They did not 
succeed, however, in their attempt to reimpose the level of political control 
Khrushchev had once exercised over the Warsaw Pact allies. While joining 
in the Soviet campaign against NATO's plans to give West Germany access 
to nuclear arms, the East Europeans tried to use it at same time to 
discourage Moscow's own military buildup. 
With Soviet blessing, but with its own priorities in mind, Poland had 
since 1958 pursued different variants of the plan advanced by its foreign 
minister Adam Rapacki for banning nuclear arms from Central Europe. If 
implemented, the plan would have made Poland and Czechoslovakia, as 
well as the two German states, wards of an international agreement, thus 
diluting Soviet control over them. Czechoslovakia prepared - though never 
actually presented - its own proposal against nuclear proliferation that also 
aimed at imposing restrictions on both superpowers.'" 
In 1965, NATO's plans for nuclear sharing became the catalyst of 
further Eastern European attempts to break out of the strait jacket imposed 
by the Soviet alliance. The January meeting of the Warsaw Pact had been 
delayed by Romanian moves designed to block the adoption of an anti-
West German statement that would hamper Bucharest's efforts to establish 
diplomatic relations with Bonn in defiance of Moscow. Poland proposed an 
expanded version of the Rapacki plan which envisaged denuclearization of 
all of Europe by an agreement between nuclear and non-nuclear states. 21 In 
allusion to NATO's "dual key" idea, Czechoslovakia demanded a say in the 
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use of any Soviet nuclear weapons that were to be installed on its territory, 
while Romania wanted to share responsibility even for those deployed in 
other Warsaw Pact countries2 ' Later that year Czechoslovakia agreed to 
stationing the weapons on its soil, but Romania never did. 
Thus NATO, having originally been created to deter a Soviet attack, 
came to exert a more subtle kind of influence on its adversaries. Arguably, 
it was always the military might of the United States alone rather than of 
the Western alliance as a whole that caused Moscow never to feel strong 
enough to seriously contemplate attacking. But it was NATO that 
epitomized the crucial contrast between the security of its Western 
members derived from their voluntary association and the insecurity of its 
Eastern opponents chafing under Soviet tutelage. Whereas Moscow's 
involuntary allies tried to improve their lot by aspiring to a position 
approximating that NATO allowed its members, the Soviet Union 
attempted to reassert its control over its allies by securing the Western 
acceptance of the Warsaw Pact as a legitimate counterpart of NATO. 
Moscow took steps toward reforming its bogus alliance just as it began 10 
seek a detente in its relations with the West. 
NATO's Eastern Imitation 
The creation in March 1969 of the Warsaw Pact's new institutions, 
particularly the committee of defense ministers and military council, 
appeared to most contemporaries as a routine development. It had been, 
after all, anticipated since the beginning of the alliance and did not 
significantly alter the effective control Moscow always exercised over the 
armed forces of its nominal allies. The addition of joint institutions could 
therefore be plausibly regarded as primarily intended to placate the 
disgruntled allies by giving them a feeling, if not the reality, of greater 
participation at a time when the recent Soviet intervention in 
Czechoslovakia had not yet achieved in Eastern Europe the degree of 
consolidation Moscow desired. 
Yet the reform of the Warsaw Pact, which had been initiated by Soviet 
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party general secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev two years before the onset of the 
Czechoslovak crisis, entailed more than merely an attempt to more 
effectively manage the alliance." In his first speech to the alliance's 
political consultative committee after his rise to power, Brezhnev explained 
that the relaxation of tension in Europe presupposed a military 
strengthening of the Warsaw Pact as well as added pressure on the West by 
extended support for the "nationalliberation wars" in the Third World." In 
reversing Khrushchev's notion that in waging the Cold War the Soviet 
system's superior non military performance justified diminished reliance on 
military power, the Brezhnev leadership saw in the buildup of military 
power a way to compensate for the system's increasingly glaring 
deficiencies in other fields. 
The drive for reinvigoration of the Warsaw Pact grew out of Moscow's 
reassessment of the NATO challenge, as a result of which improved 
opportunities could be seen to advance Soviet power and intluence amid 
reduced international tension - the gist of the Soviet concept of detente. By 
the end of 1966, the Kremlin leadership concluded that because of the 
growing destructiveness of nuclear weapons the inhibitions against their 
use were such that a military conflict in Europe need not necessarily 
become nuclear." Ironically, it was NATO's shift from its posture of 
massive retaliation, with its reliance on nuclear weapons, to the seemingly 
more sensible strategy of tlexible response, intended to give a chance to 
conventional defense, that made Moscow perceive "a real possibility of 
conducting conventional war in Europe."" According to the Warsaw Pact 
supreme commander Marshal Andrei Grechko, combat readiness and 
advances in weaponry now mattered more than strategic missiles. The new 
Soviet priorities translated into an accelerated modernization of the 
alliance's arsenal and its increasingly realistic war games, practicing 
offensive thrusts into NATO territory. 
Thus the advent of detente coincided with the militarization of Soviet 
policy after Khrushchev's unsuccessful attempt at its demilitarization. 
Moscow tried to minimize its allies' concern about the new trend by 
inviting them to present proposals for the further development of the 
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Warsaw Pact. Some of the allies wanted the pact to be looser, others more 
effective. The Romanians tried to limit the members' obligations to 
consultation and not add any institutions that could infringe on their 
sovereignty." The Czechoslovaks, in allusion to French President Charles 
de Gaulle's doubts about the U.S. nuclear umbrella, questioned the utility of 
the Soviet one:: and demanded a greater voice in the alliance's decisions.211 
The Poles wanted the Soviet contribution to the Warsaw Pact's budget to 
increase from 31 to at least 50 per cent." 
In the end, the reform fell short of the Soviet desiderata. The March 
1969 Warsaw Pact conference in Budapest created the foundations of a 
military command structure comparable to NATO, including particularly a 
committee of defense ministers, military council, and committee on 
technology, but postponed the establishment of a unified military staff. It 
failed to create a permanent secretariat, whose absence prominently 
distinguished the Eastern from the Western alliance. With Moscow's 
attention focused on its widening rift with China, which had recently 
climaxed in armed clashes along the Ussuri river, the outcome of the 
conference was a compromise between the dominant power and its restive 
allies. The watered-down final communique omitted several important 
topics on which no consensus could be reached. 
The discussion at the conference revealed significant differences of 
opinion about how the Warsaw Pact should function and about its 
relationship with NATO. Reaffirming Khrushchev's old proposal to 
dissolve both alliances, Romania sought to insert into the public 
communique formulations that would make it more difficult for Moscow to 
justify another intervention such as the one just sutTered by 
Czechoslovakia. Poland and Hungary joined Romania in advocating a 
compact of European states against the use of force or the threat of force.)() 
Later on Warsaw went so far as to prepare on its own a project for a 
European security treaty which the Soviet Union felt compelled to block 
before it could be made public. It proposed obligatory consultation between 
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the two alliances in case of a crisis, which could give NATO a say in the 
affairs of Eastern Europe, and envisaged disarmament measures that might 
require greater cuts by the East than by the West. 31 
Detente entailed calculated risk for Moscow. Concessions to the East 
Europeans were not to hamper the twin goals of strengthening Soviet 
control over them and enhancing the military effectiveness of the Warsaw 
Pact in the long run. Nor was the expansion of its conventional capability 
to be restricted by arms control agreements with the West which limited the 
growth of the respective nuclear arsenals. The alliance was consequently 
supplemented by a new set bilateral treaties which included specific 
references to the Soviet hegemonial role. 
In 1973 that role was reinforced by the adoption of new rules which 
allowed for bypassing the Warsaw Pact's principle of unanimity, thus 
nullifying possible opposition by members other than the already excluded 
Albania. This applied particularly to the Romanians, although their 
obstructionism was more an annoyance than a threat to Moscow. "One must 
be patient with them," Brezhnev responded in 1966 to East German party 
secretary Waiter Ulbrichfs indignation at the antics of the Romanian leader 
and his representatives. "Comrade Ceau~escu is still young and 
inexperienced."l:!. 
The buildup of the Warsaw Pact into a credible equivalent of NATO 
helped set into motion the arms control negotiations regarded as the critical 
yardstick of detente. The December 1970 communique of the North 
Atlantic Council for the first time referred to the communist alliance as a 
legitimate negotiating partner - a landmark on its progress toward 
respectability since its uncertain debut fifteen years earlier when NATO 
officials had contemptuously dismissed it as a "cardboard castle."" The 
inflated respect subsequently accorded to the seemingly formidable military 
edifice of the Soviet bloc had the important effect of diverting attention 
from the more pertinent real weaknesses of its political and economic 
structures. 
The excessive preoccupation in the pursuit of detente with the process 
of arms control, with its wildly speculative scenarios concerning the 
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potential utilization of the increasingly surrealistic nuclear arsenals, 
highlighted the growing mismatch between military power and political 
purpose. It was indicative of the inadequacy of the process that the arsenals 
kept growing even as their justification was becoming ever more tenuous. 
Yet the discrepancy did not seem to matter as long as the perception of 
military parity between East and West nurtured the feeling of detente; the 
problem arose once detente started to falter, for no readily identifiable 
reasons, in the mid-nineteen-seventies. 
Although the problem troubled both alliances, it was more acute for the 
Soviet Union, which had set so much store by its military ascendancy and 
yet began to feel insecure again after the temporary reassurance provided 
by the initial success of its detente calculation. For the Soviet leaders it 
would have been all but impossible to recognize that the root causes of 
their new insecurity were internal rather than external. The systemic 
weaknesses of their power bloc had reached a critical point by 1975 - the 
year of the Helsinki agreement they hailed as a major achievement in the 
consolidation of their empire. Instead the agreement proved a catalyst of 
the empire's undoing because of the unexpected potency of its human rights 
provisions in exposing the Soviet system's critical vulnerabilities. 
Incapable of grasping the real reasons of what went wrong with detente, 
Moscow was predisposed to perceive the threat to its security as being 
military and emanating from NATO. Soviet generals, with their 
professional vested interest in the existence of an enemy to defend the 
country against, had never really ceased to regard the Western alliance as 
hostile and arms control as risky. Even as detente was beginning to bloom 
in 1971, the supreme commander of the Warsaw Pact Marshal Iakubovskii 
cautioned its assembled representatives that the situation was "still 
extremely tense."" And once the United States disengaged itself from the 
Vietnam war, the Soviet military were quick to see a threat in Washington's 
again turning its attention to NATO. In an alarmist response to NATO's 
modernization program, they directed the Warsaw Pact allies to shorten the 
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warning times for alerts and improve their forces' state of readiness in 
anticipation of nuclear strikes to be launched against enemy 
concentrations.35 
Incapable of reassuring themselves sufficiently regardless of what 
NATO might or might not be doing, the Soviet leaders could therefore 
never make the necessary political decision to reverse their burgeoning 
military programs, which then continued to be driven by momentum rather 
than by design. The inherent danger was not so much in the growth of the 
nuclear arsenals - limited, however inadequately, by the arms control 
agreements - as in the expansion of the conventional forces, subjected to no 
such limitations. Moscow obstructed the talks between the two alliances 
that Washington hoped would lead to a mutual and balanced reduction of 
those forces in Europe. The Soviet Union also used its superiority in 
conventional forces to elaborate a new military doctrine that envisaged 
using them to defeat NATO before its members could agree on resorting to 
nuclear arms for defense; hence also the priority Moscow assigned to 
campaigning for a ban on their first use. 3fi 
In 1977 Moscow initiated the deployment of its new SS-20 medium-
range nuclear missiles not because of any new threat from NATO, but 
simply because the missiles were available and, considering their range, 
presumably suitable to impress upon the United States that a nuclear war 
could remain limited to Europe while sparing the territories of both 
superpowers. As if a confrontation were looming, the following year the 
Warsaw Pact finally established its unified command structure for war, with 
the main purpose of tightening control over nuclear weapons." Its 
commander-in-chief became none other than Brezhnev himself, by then in 
an advanced stage of decrepitude. 
Brezhnev's appointment as the nominal chief of the alliance epitomized 
Soviet confusion about the substance of the security it was meant to serve. 
The Warsaw Pact's chief of staff Gen. Anatolii Gribkov later reminisced 
that his superiors never came to grips with the question of who would 
actually initiate war. With all of Western Europe covered with Soviet 
missiles, the question of what to do next was asked but never answered." 
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Contrary to the contemporary estimates that the Moscow leaders had 
adopted a pragmatic outlook compatible with Western thinking, internal 
evidence now available from the Soviet side shows they were in fact 
prevented by ideological blinkers from grasping that NATO could possibly 
feel threatened by their military buildup. They genuinely believed that there 
was a fair balance between the two alliances for, as Gen. Gribkov 
retrospectively described it, "we had more tanks [but] you had mOre anti-
tank weapons."" The extent to which both sides were acting at cross 
purposes while thinking they finally understood each other was one of the 
disturbing ironies of detente. 
Moscow did not see a good reason for the Western alarm about the 
deployment of its SS-20 missiles, for which there was no NATO equivalent. 
Hence it considered totally unwarranted the alliance's December 1979 
"dual decision" to proceed with the installation of the qualitatively superior 
Pershing-2 and cruise missiles if the concurrent Geneva negotiations did 
not result in the withdrawal of the already deployed Soviet weapons. In 
trying to prevent NATO from achieving what Warsaw Pact supreme 
commander Marshal Viktor Kulikov described as its goal of military-
technological superiority,'" the Soviet leaders unwisely placed their bets on 
the success of the opposition to the "Euromissile" deployments by the 
Western "peace movement," which they verbally supported but did not 
control. 
Moscow similarly discounted Western concern about the material 
support it gave to Third World "national liberation movements," which it 
also did not sufficiently control. It supported them on mainly ideological 
grounds, regarding their victory as a historical inevitability in which the 
capitalists would have no choice but to acquiesce - as the United States had 
seemingly done in Vietnam. NATO was a secondary consideration in the 
Soviet Union's using its growing surplus of conventional weaponry to 
pursue ill-defined ambitions in parts of the globe where it had no vital 
security interests - in American eyes the most important single cause of the 
collapse of detente. Baffled by Washington's indignation at the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Brezhnev sounded as if he 
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truly believed the explanation he gave his Warsaw Pact allies, namely that 
"the ghosts of the Cold War have come out not from the ravines of 
Afghanistan or the high plateaus of Iran but from the corridors of the White 
House."';1 
As tension mounted, the transformation of the Warsaw Pact into a 
military counterpart of NATO, originally intended by Moscow to make 
detente possible, instead hastened its demise, The Soviet bloc's arms 
buildup gave a false impression of its strength just as its terminal decline 
was accelerating, while on the Western side the opposite was happening. 
The spreading mood of Europessimism and malaise under the Carter 
administration, with its image of indecision and incompetence, were 
deceptive of the essential soundness of the Western alliance, thus 
increasing the risks of miscalculation by the Kremlin. 
Concerned primarily about parity, Soviet officials did not share their 
Western counterparts' intense preoccupation with the maintenance of "crisis 
stability."" If the overiy sophisticated Western strategists took much too 
seriously far-fetched scenarios involving nuclear weapons, the more 
simple-minded Kremlin leadership did not take seriously enough the 
destabilizing potential of the conventional armaments that it allowed to 
grow without adequate control. As the aging political leaders were loosing 
their grip, by default rather than by design the Soviet military became 
capable of exercising greater influence on policy than was generally 
suspected. 
While the Soviet military, traditionally lacking political ambitions of 
their own, did not initiate the Soviet foreign ventures that doomed detente, 
they welcomed the opportunity to develop and test their weaponry without 
regard to political costs. Having become for all intents and purposes an 
extended arm of the Moscow ministry of defense, the Warsaw Pact 
continued to practice targeting for nuclear strikes against NATO and 
simulating conventional thrusts into Western Europe until as late as 1989." 
The most pernicious product of the Brezhnev "era of stagnation," the 
increasingly influential Soviet generals, were totally devoted to the system 
that secured their privileges and would survive it as its most reactionary 
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and anti~ Western remnant. Given the generals' prejudices and input into 
policy during the Soviet Union's twilight years, Moscow's benign response 
to the massive rearmament program NATO adopted during the Reagan 
administration was therefore not a foregone conclusion. 
NATO and the Soviet Collapse 
How important was the role of NATO, with its own misconceptions about 
the Soviet threat, in encouraging Moscow's historic reassessment of the 
Western threat, without which the Cold War could not have ended as 
peacefully as it did? The Kremlin leaders initially showed little inclination 
to come to grips with the challenge they unexpectedly faced from a 
president rated by the veteran Soviet foreign minister Andrei A. Gromyko 
as "no lion", with nothing but a vacuum "behind his statements, indeed, 
behind his soul."" Yet when the Reagan administration in March 1983 
announced its Strategic Defense Initiative, which challenged Moscow to a 
technological race, Brezhnev's successor as party general secretary Iurii 
Andropov - as the former head of the KGB intelligence agency the person 
best informed of his country's real condition - took alarm. 
Andropov accurately perceived the NATO rearmament policy pressed 
by the "political bully" in the White House as designed to enable the West 
to "radically change the international situation to its advantage, so that it 
could dictate to us how we should live and handle our affairs. "45 In an 
important secret speech to the Warsaw Pact allies in January 1983, the 
Soviet leader lamented that the ensuing arms race would impose an 
intolerable burden on his country while presenting no such problem for the 
United States, which presumably could exact the necessary sacrifices from 
its citizens by cutting down their welfare.'" His reasoning was a reversal of 
the argument frequently advanced against Reagan's rearmament program by 
its Western critics wrongly attributing that capability to the Soviet 
government. 
With an uneasy eye on Romania's demands for unilateral armament 
reductions by the Warsaw Pact and the participation of its members in the 
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arms control negotiations between the two superpowers, Andropov insisted 
that the effective equality of their respective arsenals amounted to "more or 
less stable parity" between the two alliances, which NATO sought to upset 
by striving for superiority. Convinced lhat Washington was actively 
preparing to launch a nuclear war, he responded to Reagun's announcement 
of the new U.S. strategic doctrine by ordering a crash effort to lind out 
about the putative U.S. plans for a nuclear first strike - an undertaking 
remembered by Soviet ambassador Anatolii Dobrynin as the "largest 
peacetime intelligence operation in Soviet history."47 
Following the approval in November 1983 of NATO's Euromissile 
deployment program by the West German parliament, which removed the 
last obstacle to its implementation, the Kremlin was badly shaken by the 
alliance's command exercise "Able Archer," whose simulation of nuclear 
release procedures in the event of war had an electronic signi.lture 
indistinguishable from the real thing." Yet despite Andropov's alarm at 
what he wrongly believed to be NATO's aggressive intentions and his 
awareness of what he rightly appreciated as his country's vulnerability to 
Western "human rights blackmail," he did not draw practical conclusions 
from his grim assessment of the situation. He failed to act upon the 
memorandum prepared for him by his security adviser Viacheslav 
Dashichev who - in accordance with the Western concept of "security 
dilemma" - argued that the Soviet striving for security at the expense of 
other countries inevitably compelled the latter to react by forming a hostile 
alliance. 4 'l 
Instead, the short-sighted reaction of the by then seriously ill Andropov 
to NATO's resolve was acting on the Soviet threat to break off the Geneva 
arms control negotiations, as favored by his foreign minister, and proceed 
with the deployment of additional missiles in Eastern Europe, as desired by 
his generals. This time, the resentful Warsaw Pact allies included not only 
the maverick Romania but also Moscow's most faithful ally, East Germany. 
In a display of self-confidence at a time of mounting leadership crisis in the 
Kremlin, East German party chief Erich Honecker signaled in nO uncertain 
terms his unhappiness with the Soviet willingness to sacrifice the remnants 
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of detente at the expense of Europeans. He sought "damage limitation" by 
forming a "coalition of reason" with West Germany, thus discharging what 
he considered a special responsibility of the two German states for the 
preservation of peace.-5(1 
Honecker took the unusual step of trying to tell his Soviet patrons what 
was in their best interest because he was mistakenly convinced that he 
would be able to drive a wedge between West Germany and the other 
NATO members, thus weakening their resolve to proceed with the 
Euromissile deployments. At the peak of his confidence in his regime's 
growing international stature and internal stability, he became the Warsaw 
Pact's leading advocate of a demilitarization of the East-West relationship, 
which, much like Khrushchev before, he justified by socialism's allegedly 
growing superiority over capitalism. In cultivating this self-deception, he 
found a kindred soul in none other than his Romanian counterpart Nicolae 
Ceau~escu, with whom he exchanged compliments about their respective 
countries being "from the sociopolitical point of view far ahead of the most 
advanced capitalist nations."" 
At a meeting with Andropov's similarly infirm successor Konstantin 
Chernenko, Honecker defended his method of subverting NATO, boasting 
that his country was able to exercise greater influence on West Germany 
than was the case the other way around. To a skeptical response by Soviet 
minister of defense Dmitrii Ustinov, he retorted that "we know very well 
what we are doing," proudly citing the recent decoration of "two female 
comrades who had worked in the NATO headquarters" with medals for 
their spying feats." Honecker's arrogance contrasted with the defensiveness 
of his Soviet interlocutors, worried about the ascendancy of the Western 
alliance yet unable to decide what, if anything, could be done about it. 
The lack of an effective decision-making mechanism in the Krernlin 
during the succession crisis at least ensured that for the time being nothing 
would be done to provoke the West to further accelerate its military 
buildup. In September 1984, Marshal Sergei Ogarkov, reputed in the West 
to be a believer in the possibility of waging and winning a conventional 
war by offensive thrust into NATO territory, lost his influential position as 
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chief of general staff to become the commander of a newly formed special 
grouping of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and western USSR. While his 
competencies remained unclear, the reorganization tended to blunt rather 
than sharpen the Warsaw Pact's ability to deliver the dreaded thrust." More 
importantly, as soon as Mikhail Gorbachev became the new party general 
secretary early the following year, the Soviet Union froze its missile 
deployments in Eastern Europe and reversed itself by returning to the 
Geneva arms control talks despite NATO's failure to fulfill any of the 
preconditions Moscow had set for their resumption. 
By then a reassessment of Soviet security policy, the beginnings of 
which can be traced to the aftennath of Reagan's announcement of the 
Strategic Defense Initiative, was underway. It revealed significant 
differences of outlook between civilian experts, better attuned to the 
Western thinking because of their frequent interaction with Western 
officials, and the more parochial military officers, who lacked the same 
educational experience. Indeed, the emergence within the Soviet 
establishment of an influential group of people with a vested interest in 
continued dialogue with the West, or at least the preservation of their travel 
privileges, has been plausibly identified as an important by-product of 
detente, deeply subversive of the Soviet system by sowing among its 
beneficiaries doubts about the worthiness of defending it in its present 
form.54 
In a seminal article in 1988, Soviet security expert Sergei Kondrashev 
dismissed the NATO threat as an invention of a system that needed a 
foreign enemy to justify its repressive domestic policies and oversized 
armed forces, whose commanders were still mesmerized by the memory of 
their narrow escape from defeat at the hands of the Nazi invaders in 1941. 
He described the real threat as being "in ourselves," thus identifying the 
critical link between the necessity of internal reform and of military 
accommodation abroad." In pointing the Soviet reformers to the way to 
that accommodation, made imperative by the military buildup promoted by 
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the Western political Right, the innovative thinking of the Letiist critics of 
the buildup provided the necessary complement to help bring the Cold War 
confrontation to a happy end, 
In March 1985, the Czechoslovak dissident organization Charter 77 
addressed to the Amsterdam conference organized by Western pacinsts a 
call fur the dissolution of both the Warsaw Pact and NATO on the grounds 
that they were stumbling blocs to the reunification of Europe. In an essay 
written for the conference, in which he was prevented from participating, 
Czech playwright Vaclav Havel invoked plague on both houses while 
challenging the Soviet Union to relinquish control over Eastern Europe, 
although he did not expected it to comply.'" In the opinion of his fellow-
dissident Dienstbier, "if the populations of these countries were offered the 
status of Finland in a free referendum, they would vote for it with 
overwhelming enthusiasm, and would certainly prefer it to transferring 
their allegiance into the other camp."" 
In trying to stop the NATO buildup by providing it with the necessary 
reassurance about Soviet intentions, the Gorbachev leadership embraced 
sllch concepts of the Western Left as "non-provocative defense" and 
"structural inability to attack."" The June 1986 meeting of the Warsaw Pact 
political consultative committee supported a restructuring along lines that 
would "exclude not only the possibility of a surprise attack but also the 
waging of large offensive operations."" As Gorbachev came to realize, 
"nowadays progress is only possible when the interests of all parties are 
taken into account."IiO 
Far from being intended to weaken the Warsaw Pact, the revision of 
Soviet security policy aimed at strengthening it by greater flexibility. 
Following the inconclusive Gorbachev-Reagan summit at Reykjavik, the 
alliance decided to launch a "broad offensive" to convince the Western 
public, not only by words but also by deeds, that it was no longer a threat, 
thus taking the steam out of Reagan's military engine!') At its Berlin 
meeting in May 1987, the Warsaw Pact issued a statement describing its 
military doctrine as that of defensive sufficiency." Soviet defense minister 
Dmitrii Iazov explained to the participants that this meant maintaining an 
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equilibrium at the lowest possible level while reducing the military 
potential to the minimum necessary for defense; publicly, however, he 
qualitled his explanation by saying that "the limits of sufficiency are set not 
by us, but by the actions of the U.S.A. and NATO."" 
Moscow tried to beat NATO at its own game by adopting its positions 
on arms control, but no substantial Western concessions were forthcoming. 
Gorbachev nevertheless proceeded toward the conclusion of the landmark 
INF agreement on the limitation of medium-range nuclear missiles 
essentially on Western terms, while insisting to his Warsaw Pact allies that 
the "initiative is in our hands."'" But this was not the opinion shared by the 
Soviet ministry of defense, whose spokesman Gen. Mikhailov warned them 
that NATO's military strength was growing and the danger of war 
correspondingly increasing. Marshal Kulikov therefore called for 
undiminished defense spending, further modernization of the Soviet bloc's 
armed forces, and better intelligence gathering to avoid being taken by 
surprise by the enemy." 
Meanwhile a rapprochement between the two alliances had been 
progressing. Already since 1987 they had been engaged in negotiations 
about the reduction of their respective conventional forces in Europe 
which, despite resistance by Soviet military, were proceeding faster than 
originally expected toward the rectification of their lopsided ratio. 
Moreover, the Warsaw Pact acted upon the Polish proposal to exchange 
visits of parliamentarians, thus allowing delegations of the North Atlantic 
Assembly to interact with their counterparts in Hungary, Poland, and 
Czechoslovakia." The interaction reinforced there the growing feeling that 
the communist alliance was untenable in its present form. 
By 1988 all the Soviet bloc governments except Romania's agreed on 
the desirability of reinvigorating the Warsaw Pact by making it into a 
partnership for political and economic rather than merely military 
cooperation·7 Bucharest claimed that the reason it still preferred a looser 
grouping was to protect its national sovereignty, but the stance was in 
actuality prompted by the neostalinist regime's well-founded fear that the 
former tool of Soviet domination was becoming a vehicle of reform. Even 
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East Gennany, despite its worries about the direction the arms control 
negotiations were taking, favored the transfonnation of the alliance. Wanting 
the communist states to follow the example of Western Europe and create "a 
sort of a common parliament," Honecker was still convinced that a thriving 
"United Socialist States of Europe" could ensue." 
At the April 1989 meeting of the foreign ministers of the unraveling Soviet 
bloc, Moscow proposed an appeal to NATO on its fortieth anniversary, urging 
additional mutual anns reductions. Depicting such reductions as a way to 
strengthen the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet representative praised the Helsinki 
process for helping to overcome the division of Europe." His call for a refonn 
of the alliance to promote political and economic as well as military 
cooperation was taken further six months later by Soviet foreign minister 
Eduard Shevardnadze, who wanted it to be transfonned from a military-
political to a political-military structure, free from ideological content. By then 
Poland, no longer ruled by a communist government, opposed any alliance 
obligations that would affect the internal order of the member states, while 
Hungary insisted on their sovereign right to shape that order in accordance 
with the Helsinki principles.7l1 
Closing the circle that had been opened in 1949 by the rise of the Western 
alliance as the prime incarnation of the enemy, it was the Warsaw Pact's 
attempted remodeling to the NATO image that, despite all the imperfections of 
the latter, had by 1989 effectively neutralized the communist alliance as an 
instroment for upholding the integrity of the crumbling Soviet bloc. NATO's 
costly military buildup had set this process into motion by helping to convince 
Moscow and its Eastern European clients that by adopting Western models 
they could modernize their system and keep themselves in power. By the time 
they realized their mistake it was too late. 
The End of the Soviet Threat 
The Warsaw Pact's lingering existence after Moscow's Eastern European 
empire had come to an end in 1989 was suggestive of the difficulty the 
members of both alliances had in grasping how much the meaning of 
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security had changed. At the Malta summit in December of that year, 
Gorbachev indicated his desire to remodel the Warsaw Pact along NATO 
lines as a means of political dialogue." But the main reason why the 
alliance was widely believed to be worth preserving was its alleged 
indispensability for maintaining Europe's military stability together with 
NATO. In the later stages of the Cold War, the CFE conventional arms 
reduction talks, in which the two alliances had been partners, proved a 
more important measure of the shifting power than the increasingly esoteric 
nuclear arms control talks between the two superpowers. Yet the CFE 
negotiations were quickly overcome by events once the Soviet Union, as a 
result of the bilateral agreements it concluded with its Hungarian and 
Czechoslovak allies, now led by politically hostile governments, began to 
reduce its military presence in Eastern Europe far more drastically than the 
treaties that were being drafted envisaged. 
The preservation of the two alliances in their existing form was made 
impossible by the impending unification of Germany. On the question of its 
future, both the Soviet Union and the Germans' eastern neighbors - as well 
as their Western friends - displayed vacillation indicative of how difficult it 
was for them to imagine a European security system different from that to 
which they had become accustomed. The gyrations of Moscow's policy 
during the eight months following the breaching of the Berlin Wall showed 
the extent to which developments were driven by a momentum largely out 
of the governments' control. 
Although as late as December 1989 Gorbachev vowed never to abandon 
his country's "East German ally," soon the question was that of a united 
Germany's membership in NATO. This he said was "absolutely ruled out"; 
yet his pro-German advisor Dashichev, known to have publicly anticipated 
changes in Soviet positions before, promptly cast doubt on that statement 
by suggesting that his government's opposition to Germany's inevitable 
entry into NATO was but a bargaining ploy. Afterward Moscow floated the 
idea that each German state should remain in its respective alliance for a 
transitional period of several years. As that period seemed to be getting 
shorter and shorter, the more absurd variation, which envisaged the united 
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country's simultaneous membership in both alliances, waS raised and 
dropped. By June 1990, Gorbachev was saying that the decision about 
whether to join or not to join NATO ought to be left to the German people, 
but then he corrected himself by explaining that he really meant the 
decision about joining any alliance. In the end, the Western rejection of 
Shevardnadze's last-ditch proposal to allow the united Germany to join 
NATO after five years set the stage for an agreement to ease its early 
entry.72 
The agreement was made easier by Gorbachev's view of West Germany 
as a moderating force in NATO, substantiated by Bonn's successful 
opposition to the V.S. plans for the modernization rather than retirement of 
the alliance's tactical nuclear missiles in Central Europe. The Soviet 
leader's huge popularity among West Germans, besides Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl's sensitivity to his vulnerabilities, further helped to clinch the deal. In 
return for Moscow's acquiescence in the whole Germany's all but inevitable 
membership in NATO, he promised on its behalf to abstain from 
introducing foreign troops and extending its infrastructure, including 
especially its nuclear installations, into the territory of the former GDR. 
Although the agreement was thus limited to Germany, in spirit even if not 
in letter it was at the time rightly perceived to be expressive of NATO's 
unwillingness to take advantage of the former enemy's distress by 
expanding into any territory Moscow lost. 
The two members of the former Soviet bloc whose germanophobia 
antedated communism, Czechoslovakia and Poland, had mixed feelings 
about the bigger Germany's membership in the Western alliance. The 
Warsaw Pact's meeting in February 1990 agreed on the Germans' right to 
reunification but not on its political and security implications. 
Czechoslovak president Havel, the former dissident whose public plea for 
reconciliation through acknowledging the mutually inflicted past injustices 
met with resentment from his compatriots. made contradictory statements 
about the desirability of removing all foreign troops from both Germany 
and the rest of Europe while accepting that a neutral Germany would be 
absurd. But his friend Dienstbier, now foreign minister, suggested that 
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Soviet troops might well stay in Germany, for in the part of the world 
"where we live, in a symbiosis of the Good Soldier Schweik, Franz Kafka, 
and Josef Stalin, nothing is absurd. "7] 
Unable to decide whether a rising Germany might not be a greater threat 
than the declining Soviet Union, the new Polish leaders likewise gave 
contradictory signals. While Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski 
expressed his country's preference for a unified Germany in NATO, Prime 
Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki qualified that opinion by suggesting that 
both NATO and Warsaw Pact troops remain stationed on its territory until 
the establishment of an all-European security system would allow their 
withdrawa!." Pending that uncertain prospect, Warsaw, in trying to obtain 
security assurances from Bono, unwisely abstained from pressing Moscow 
as vigorously as did the Czechs and the Hungarians to accelerate the 
departure of Soviet troops from Poland, thus allowing Soviet commanders 
to drag their feet. It was indicative of the benign winds that were blowing 
in Europe that in the end the Poles managed both to get the German 
assurances they wanted and rid themselves of the unwanted Soviet military 
presence as wel1. 75 
While the Soviet attitude toward NATO was at that time 
overwhelmingly determined by the immediate consequences of German 
unification, other members of the disintegrating Warsaw Pact, with their 
own security interests in mind, cast their eyes beyond the present, 
pondering what, if any, role either of the alliances should have to play in 
future Europe. Not surprisingly, the April 1990 meeting of the Eastern 
European heads of state in Bratislava - which brought together the 
incongruous trio of the former dissident Havel, the architect of the Polish 
martial law Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, and the veteran Hungarian party 
ideologue Matyas Szuros, ended without seriously addressing this, or any 
other, question.'" Afterward the three central European countries adopted 
positions significantly different from each other, as became evident during 
the contentious next meeting of the Warsaw Pact's political consultative 
committee in Moscow in June. Their only agreement was that both their 
alliance and NATO should best be done away with." 
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Rooted in their dissident reveries about a security system for an 
undivided Europe which not so long ago had seemed no more than a pipe 
dream, Czechoslovak politicians now developed ambitious visions of the 
future. During their visit to Washington in February 1990, Havel and 
Dienstbier startled their American hosts by proposing that NATO be 
dissolved and replaced by a broader European organization, and a1l foreign 
troops would leave the Continent. Two months later, Havel outlined to the 
Council of Europe the seemingly more plausible - indeed, as it would 
eventually turn out, prescient - vision of a Europe entrusting its security to 
a NATO radically changed in both its doctrine and its membership. And 
Dienstbier submitted to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe an elaborate proposal which envisaged all its numerous member 
states forming an European Security Commission, which would then create 
a Council at the ministerial level, to be topped by a permanent Secretariat 
in Prague. None of these proposals was acted upon." 
While in Czechoslovakia discussion about security matters remained the 
all but exclusive domain of a few prominent members of the new political 
elite, in Hungary a wider political debate embraced both former dissidents 
and reformed communists. From among the latter, foreign minister Gyula 
Horn created a stir by becoming the region's first responsible official to 
suggest that his country should join NATO. He did not quite mean what he 
was saying, however, for he quickly qualitied his statement by explaining 
that he had in mind Hungary's eventual membership in political 
organizations more or less associated with NATO, such as the Atlantic 
Assembly and the Council of Europe, after the Warsaw Pact would have 
converged with NATO and transformed itself into a political organization. 
Following the vote in the Budapest parliament which mandated 
Hungary's withdrawal from the alliance, Horn's successor Geza Jeszenszky 
formulated more clearly his government's desire to associate the country 
with as many international organizations as possible while seeking its 
security in a regional arrangement. Meanwhile different Hungarian public 
figures were expressing an array of opinions, ranging from advocacy of 
continued membership in a reformed Warsaw Pact to a call for the 
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dissolution of both military alliances. According to Jeszenszky, most 
Hungarians wanted their country to be neutral. If Prime Minister J6zsef 
Antall were to have his way, however, this would be neutrality in a Europe 
secure under the protection of an unchanged NATO." According to Csaba 
Kiss, the head of the planning department of the ministry of defense, what 
mattt:rt:u was creating "virtual security guarantees - which are not hard 
security guarantees, but mechanisms which could compensate for the lack 
of hard security guarantees."'" 
Affecting a posture of self-reliance, in 1990 Poland went the farthest in 
signaling a desire to remain neutral. Its deputy minister of defense Janusz 
Onyszkiewicz, a noted Solidarity activist, denied his government had any 
plans to join NATO." Polish spokesmen expressed their preference for an 
all-European security system, but not strongly enough to elaborate on its 
specifics in any way comparable to the Czechoslovaks. Instead, Poland 
became the first country in the region to announce its new military doctrine, 
which, however, was rightly criticized for its being "spiritually bound to the 
past." Built upon the old premise that a future war would be a clash 
between two alliances, it reaffirmed the value of Poland's existing military 
treaties, including the Warsaw Pact. As Gen. Drzewiecki's 1956 
memorandum had vainly sought to achieve under Soviet domination, the 
document asserted the government's sovereign control over the nation's 
armed forces and their operational autonomy in wartime -something that 
would have been quite an accomplishment thirty-four years earlier but was 
pointless now. Prepared by a commission chaired by the old-timer Gen. 
Jaruzelski, the defense doctrine showed the price that Poland was paying 
for having been the first country to break the communist hold on power but 
not having totally abolished it"' 
From NATO's point of view, there was something to be said for the 
continued existence of the Warsaw Pact as a framework for further 
disarmament negotiations. The July 1990 offer by the North Atlantic 
Council of a 23-point "peace package," featuring the formerly Soviet idea 
of a non-aggression pact and the abandonment of such Soviet betes /loires 
as the strategies of flexible response and forward defense, was conducive to 
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the preservation rather than disintegration of the ex-enemy alliance." Yet 
any lingering doubts among its non-Soviet members about whether it 
deserved to be kept were dispelled by their shock at Moscow's attempt at 
the end of January 1991 to forcibly suppress the Baltic people's drive for 
independence and its unhelpful attitude toward NATO's participation in the 
war against Iraq. 
The response of the three Central European governments showed how 
well they had already learned to look after their security interests together. 
Within days after the Soviet-provoked violence in ViInius and Riga, the 
Polish, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian foreign ministers meeting in 
Budapest demanded the dissolution of the military structures of the Warsaw 
Pact by mid-March at the latest. After Gorbachev, in trying to salvage the 
remnants of the alliance against secession by its members, agreed to the 
convocation of its political consultative committee, the heads of state of the 
three countries added pressure by forming a loose alliance of their own at 
the Hungarian town of Visegnid on February 15. The meeting of the 
Warsaw Pact's foreign and defense ministers ten days later then terminated 
its military functions effective March 31.84 
Alarmed at the precipitous unraveling of the alliance, the Soviet military 
insinuated that these events were a Western ploy to bring its members into 
NATO. On ostensibly realistic and pragmatic rather than ideological 
grounds, they criticized the Gorbachev regime's reformist security policy 
for supposedly allowing a threat of war to arise through the collapse of the 
Warsaw Pact and the continued existence of NATO. According to Chief of 
the General Staff Gen. MikhaiI Moiseev, the new situation invalidated the 
existing conventional arms control agreements between the two alliances, 
necessitating their renegotiation or else NATO's symmetrical dissolution. 
Minister of Defense lazov called for the agreements to be scrapped, and 
Gen. Vladimir Lobov urged a new effort to bolster the strength of the 
Soviet army."' 
In actuality, no one in a position of responsibility had so far seriously 
suggested that any East European country should become a full member of 
NATO. When in November 1990 Bulgarian foreign minister Lyuben 
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Gotsev mentioned his country's interest in doing so during his visit to 
Brussels, he meant that Sofia was offering its services to help mediate 
disputes between NATO members Greece and Turkey - an offer which was 
politely ignored."" Before visiting the same place five months later, Havel 
explained he was not going to discuss there Czechoslovak membership in 
the alliance bill merely cooperation and partnership."' In the opinion of the 
Hungarian minister of defense Lajos FUr, "considerations of a full NATO 
membership for Hungary bypass reality.""" And foreign minister 
Skubiszewski of Poland dwelt on its interest in closer military collaboration 
between the three Visegrad countries but not in the formation of a regional 
alliance"' He did not want to give the slightest comfort to former U.S. 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's alarming proposal for an Eastern 
European buffer zone between NATO and the Soviet Union. 
Kissinger's idea was particularly untimely in view of Moscow's last-
ditch attempts to substitute the Warsaw Pact with a refurbished network of 
bilateral treaties that would tie together its former members. As promoted 
by veteran Soviet diplomat Iulii Kvitsinskii at the April 1991 meeting of the 
outgoing aIIiance's deputy foreign ministers, the treaties were to prohibit 
membership in any groupings hostile to the other signatories and deny 
territory, communications, and infrastructure to loosely termed 
"aggressors."9I) Only the Romanian government, still controlled by former 
communists and favoring a separate security system for Eastern Europe, 
concluded with Moscow the kind of agreement it wanted; other countries of 
the region responded by signing security treaties with one another." 
On July 1, 1991, the Warsaw Pact ended its existence with the 
dissolution of its political remnants at its last meeting in Prague. Among 
the delegates present on the occasion, Soviet vice president Gennadii 
lanaev - by then an active participant in the conspiracy aimed at toppling 
Gorbachev - was the only one who bemoaned the passing of the alliance 
while questioning NATO's suitability to meet Europe's security needs." As 
far as Gorbachev was concerned, he wisely acquiesced in the inevitable, 
while welcoming as "very important" the statement by the London NATO 
conference which described the former enemies as security partners. 
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Regarding the phantom NATO threat, the Soviet foreign ministry 
spokesman Gennadii Gerasimov sounded relieved that "now we can tell 
those grumbling generals that they are wrong. "93 
From the collapse of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 until the 
Moscow coup attempt of August 1991, the Soviet Union had been 
retreating from Europe but otherwise retaining a formidable military 
capability while its political direction remained uncertain. Under these 
trying circumstances, the East Europeans and their Western well-wishers 
proved capable of managing the resulting security challenges with 
considerable success. They did so by using their available resources 
without regarding it necessary to expand NATO to the east, while also 
resisting the idea that the alliance should be disbanded. Ironically, this 
sensible frame of mind began to change soon after the failure of the anti-
Gorbachev conspiracy precipitated the breakup of the Soviet state and with 
it the disappearance of the Soviet threat. 
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from the Demise of the Warsaw Pact to 
the Enlargement off Nato 
The Mythical Security Vacuum 
The Moscow coup attempt of August 1991 sent shivers down the East 
Europeans' spines. Attesting to their new spirit of cooperation, senior 
officials of the three Visegnid countries met for emergency talks in Warsaw, 
while their governments kept in close contact by telephone and the Polish 
army was ready to mobilize.''' Although the quick collapse of the 
amateurish conspiracy soon proved their fears unfounded, its very 
occurrence underscored, as Jeszenszky told the North Atlantic Assembly, 
the need for their countries' "institutionalized and formalized political 
relationship with NATO,"" In ajoint declaration issued in Cracow, AntaII, 
Havel, and Polish president Lech Wah;sa vowed their countries' intention 
to form such a relationship. They were ready, Skubiszewski added, for any 
kind of association, including membership in the alliance. Yet for the time 
being their practical goal was, according to Jeszenszky, a "framework for 
regular consultations on security issues. ,,% 
The alliance responded promptly and effectively by creating the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council as a consultative forum that would bring 
together for annual meetings the foreign ministers of NATO, of the six 
former Warsaw Pact states, and of the three by now independent Baltic 
republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. First proposed by Secretary of 
State James Baker and German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher at 
the beginning of October, the Council was inaugurated on December 20, 
1991. At a time when the Soviet Union was breaking up and an array of 
independent states, including a new Russia, was emerging from the debris, 
the NATO initiative generally received a good reception. Russian president 
Boris Yeltsin, riding the crest of his popularity as a hero of the resistance 
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against the reactionary coup, declared enthusiastically that although "today 
we are not posing the question of Russia's entry into NATO [ ... ) We are 
ready to consider it as a long-term political goal.'''J7 
Yeltsin's statement elicited Skubiszewski's reminder that for the moment 
the admission of new members was not topical but, should it become so, 
Poland cOlIsidereu itself a candidate.9 1( The East Europeans welcomed the 
North Atlantic Cooperation Council as the beginning rather than the end of 
a process they were trying to accelerate in order to bring themselves closer 
to the Western alliance. Havel during his visit to its Brussels headquarters 
spoke eloquently about his country's need for reassurance, so that in the 
event of a threat it would not "feel alone and forgotten by the democratic 
community." He depicted the region as "sliding into a I ... ] security 
vacuum.'''N 
The much overused term was indicative of the prevailing loose thinking 
about security. Even experts were prepared to argue that despite the 
absence of serious external threats there was a "real and worrisome" 
vacuum in Eastern Europe. "" If employed as an analytical tool rather than a 
rhetorical f1ourish, the concept conveys the proposition, central to the 
realist theory of international relations, that a deficit of power anywhere 
inevitably attracts power from somewhere else, breeding contlict among 
states competing to fill the void. 
Yet the peaceful ending of the Cold War after the Soviet Union 
abstained from using its ample power to defend its supposedly vital 
interests exposed the inadequacy of such a mechanistic model for 
explaining the behavior of governments. Nor did the notable reluctance of 
European states to be drawn into the ostensible vacuum created by the 
subsequent collapse of Yugoslavia make the old notions of power politics 
any more applicable to the new Europe. Indeed, the main reason why the 
Yugoslav crisis festered for so long was precisely the outsiders' 
unwillingness to get involved in an area which, rightly or wrongly, they did 
not consider to be in their vital interest. The fuzzy imagery of a security 
vacuum nevertheless continued to exercise its superficial attraction. 
With the Yugoslav tragedy before their eyes, Eastern European leaders 
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sought to engage NATO in the region on the grounds, later proven to be 
false, that the Balkan instability was contagious; in reality, the self-
destructive atrocities visited by the Yugoslav belligerents upon one another 
had the salutary effect of discouraging rather than encouraging potential 
imitators. Understandably, the first formal request for admission into NATO 
came in December 1992 from the neighboring Albania, but was not 
seriously considered.Hl1 More difficult to ignore were the pleas by the 
Hungarian government which, following the attack on a Hungarian village 
by a Yugoslav warplane, began to urge NATO to not only act in its own 
defense but also protect European countries outside of its treaty area. "" 
The Budapest government was initially reluctant to allow NATO air 
operations over its territory, lest they provoke Serb retaliation against the 
Hungarian ethnic minority left in rump-Yugoslavia. But by the end of 1992, 
having received an up-la-date anti-aircraft defense system from the United 
States, Hungary was providing its airspace to help NATO monitor the UN 
ban on flights over Bosnia and drop humanitarian supplies there. At the 
same time, it took the lead in diplomatic activities aimed at spinning a web 
of diverse military ties with not only its former Warsaw Pact allies but also 
nearly all the member states of NATO. "" Still, as late as 1994 no more than 
a third of Hungarians wanted their country to become a member of 
NATO. "" 
Invoking the danger of "Yugoslavization," Walpa in April 1992 
proposed the so-called "NATO 11" - a quasi-alliance of Eastern European 
countries, including the former Soviet republics but not Russia, which 
would help defuse regional conflicts, if necessary by jointlY using force, 
until NATO would pmve up to the task. "" A clumsy attempt to elicit in 
advance the assurance of their admission into NATO, the proposal made no 
headway. Yet this did not prevent Poland from proceeding to systematically 
prepare itself for NATO membership with a single-mindedness unparalleled 
in the region. 
As early as March 1992, Polish minister of defense Jan Parys 
announced that his nation's armed forces would be restructured so that they 
could use NATO weapons and offered its territory to the alliance for 
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training purposes. Wfl His successor Janusz Onyszkiewicz hailed the 
conclusion in January 1993 of the agreement on military cooperation with 
Germany as a milestone On his country's road to NATO. With an eye on the 
French-German example, Warsaw was particularly keen on bringing 
German soldiers to Polish soil for joint exercises to show how well the 
reconciliation between the two peoples was progressing. Polish delegations 
became frequents guests to NATO's military installations while large 
numbers of Polish officers enrolled in its military schools. "" 
The draft of Poland's new military doctrine, prepared in July 1992 to 
replace the obsolete communist product, was the most advanced such 
document in Eastern Europe. Its enumeration of the threats the country 
faced showed how profoundly the reality and perception of security had 
changed. Rather than in any military danger, the document saw potential 
security threats in such contingencies as the possible spillover of political 
and social disorder from the east, Poland's own internal instability, or "other 
countries' failure to meet their contractual obligations" - a euphemism for 
economic blackmail by Russia. It set as the nation's goal its admission into 
NATO, besides separate military arrangements with im1ividual members of 
the Western alliance and cooperative lioks within the Visegnid "triangle.""" 
Venturing the prediction that Poland would be NATO's first new 
member, possibly still during Secretary General Manfred Worner's tenure, 
Onyszkiewicz promised to make the Polish military politically neutral to 
improve the country's eligibility for membership."" He was addressing a 
troubling legacy of a nation whose generals had often been contemptuous 
of politicians, and had acted accordingly. Nor were the politicians above 
the temptation to manipulate the military to serve their own ambitions, as 
President Wal~sa had been trying by stretching his authority as 
commander-in-chief under Poland's patchwork provisional constitution. 
Defying the principle of civilian control of the military, he obstructed the 
subordination of his faverite chief of staff to the ministry of defense 
controlled by his political opponents.'''' Yet even while this convoluted 
conllict remained unresolved, Poland continued to build up its credibility as 
a NATO candidate. 
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Czechoslovakia, beset by an internal crisis that in 1993 led to its 
splitting into two states, did not cultivate that credibility as assiduously as 
Poland. Whatever the elite's preferences, "many people brought up in 
almost pathological mistrust of the West's military institutions" dreamt 
about neutrality.'" The Czech army, still ridden with communist-era 
officers, was described as having "lost breath" or only recently awakening 
from a "deep sleep."'" It was not clear what, if any, role the Czechs would 
want to play in NATO. Even after signing a cooperation agreement with it, 
Prime Minister V.clav Klaus showed little enthusiasm. '13 In a conversation 
with NATO's supreme commander Gen. John Shalikashvili, he mused that 
his country's membership in the alliance depended, first of all, on whether it 
would continue to exist, besides internal Czech politics and the situation in 
the former Soviet Union. '14 
In Slovakia, neither the elite nor the public seemed to take a serious 
interest in security. The country was the only one in Central Europe where 
as late as 1993 most people still believed that NATO, as a product of the 
Cold War, should follow the example of the Warsaw Pact and dissolve 
itself, liS In an interview shortly before the proclamation of independent 
Slovakia, its leading foreign affairs specialists were unwilling or unable to 
articulate any coherent opinion on its future relations with NATO. 116 Later 
on Prime Minister Vladimir MeCiar's ambivalence contrasted with a more 
positive attitude of the foreign ministry.117 After his first visit to the NATO 
headquarters, the Prime Minister commented whimsically that the Slovaks 
should not seek membership in order to spare the alliance trouble. "They 
would have to refuse us," he predicted correctly.'" 
Russia's response to the evolving rapprochement between its former 
allies and former enemies was not unequivocally hostile as long as Moscow 
could itself hope to benefit from a rapprochement with NATO, particularly 
by obtaining its recognition of equal legitimacy in peacekeeping matters. 
Yeltsin's suggestion that NATO send a peacekeeping force to Nagorno-
Karabakh, the hotbed of Azeri-Armenian conflict in the Caucasus, could be 
seen as an invitation to reciprocity. I 19 Yet since Russia's claiming the role of 
the force of order on the Soviet Union's whole former territory, with the 
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possible exception of the Baltic states, was widely, if not quite fairly, seen 
as imperialism in disguise, Moscow did not get the recognition it wanted.'''' 
And it was less likely to succeed after provoking indignation by its 
disastrous pacification of Chechnia - technically its own home territory. 
Nor was the Russian policy of protecting the Serbs in Bosnia from 
NATO intervention, which alone was apt to bring the hostilities there to an 
end, conducive to smooth cooperation between Moscow and the alliance. 
The areas where Western cooperation with the Russian military was 
making progress and bringing results - particularlY the dismantling of the 
former Soviet nuclear arsenal and measures to prevent the proliferation of 
its remnants - were areas where the Western partner was the United States 
rather than NATO. When NATO officers visited Russia to discuss 
partnership and collaboration, they often encountered among their 
counterparts the same mistrust and suspicion that used to be typical of the 
Soviet times, now supplemented by a sense of inferiority resulting from the 
country's humiliating military decline. 
The draft of Russia's new defense doctrine, prepared by its general staff 
rather than its parliament and made public in May 1992, was a distressingly 
old-fashioned document. l2 ' Echoing Soviet worst-case scenarios, it 
mandated preparation for a large-scale war against the implied NATO 
enemy by maintaining large counteroffensive capability - however illusory 
this was given the country's parlous financial condition. Warning the West 
against taking advantage of Russia's current weakness, the document 
envisaged making the loose Commonwealth of Independent States into a 
tight alliance along the lines of the Warsaw Pact.'" By contrast, it 
recommended that NATO be superseded by an all-European collective 
security structure. The draft still seemed too pro-Western to the 
conservative generals, including Yeltsin's future appointee as defense 
minister Igor Rodionov. 
Alluding to the resentments of the Russian military and the nationalist 
agitation against the Yeltsin government, foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev 
tried to dissuade NATO from expanding eastward lest water be brought 
onto the mill of Russia's hardliners. Yet it was in accordance with the 
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preferences of those hardliners that he campaigned to convince the Western 
alliance either to dissolve itself or become a subsidiary of the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe. This ineffectual grouping of all the 
countries of the Continent operating on the principle of consensus was 
promoted by Moscow as the pillar of Europe's vaunted "security 
architecture."'" In Kozyrev's hardball imagery, it was "not a matter of 
increasing the number of NATO team players playing on the European field 
but of reconstructing the field itself and adjusting the rules of the game to 
apply to the new conditions."'" 
Yet despite the lack of the new architecture, Europe was enjoying an 
unprecedented measure of security. '25 Following the withdrawal of the last 
ex-Soviet troops from Eastern Europe) the region was now more secure 
from outside threats than it had ever been in history. Poland, no longer 
sharing a common border with Russia except for the Kaliningrad enclave, 
found itself surrounded by seven new states, all of them preoccupied with 
domestic consolidation. Nor did Hungary find it easy to sustain its 
traditional view of itself as an island buffeted by hostile seas; unable to 
identify credible military threats, it singled out as the objectives of its 
security policy membership in the major European international 
organizations and better relations with neighbors.'26 And the peaceful 
breakup of Czechoslovakia was a vivid demonstration that the region's 
proverbial ethnic frictions need not lead to violence. 
There was, to be sure, the nasty war in former Yugoslavia. Yet despite 
the European powers' embarrassing failure to stop it, the war notably failed 
to spread, thus defying the historical stereotype of the Balkan "powder 
keg." Nor did the predicted masses of refugees tleeing the political and 
social turmoil in Russia ever materialize. And the extent of disintegration 
of its armed forces deprived its image as a dangerous international 
aggressor of any plausibility in the foreseeable future. 
This unfamilar situation generated uncertainty about NATO's mission 
and its very raison d'etre. In trying to respond to the East Europeans' 
pressure for additional security that they did not need and to the Russians' 
concern about NATO's expansion that they could not stop, the West's will 
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was being sapped by its self-imposed restraint in Yugoslavia. The longer 
Europe's sole remaining military alliance was proving impotent in the one 
part of Eastern Europe where a war was raging, the greater was the urge to 
do at least something in the part of the region where no danger loomed yet 
whose governments still yearned for reassurance. This was the awkward 
background of NATO's decision to enlarge. 
The Origins of Enlargement 
On his return from the United States in June 1993, the Polish minister of 
defense Onyszkiewicz could report with satisfaction that the possibility of 
bringing the four Visegnld countries into NATO was beginning to be 
discussed within the Clinton administrationY7 Mid-level officials in the 
State Department and the White House have since been identified as 
having generated pressure for an early decision. But Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher, his deputy Strobe Talbott, and much of the top U.S. 
military harbored misgivings.'28 Assistant Secretary of State for European 
and Canadian Affairs Stephen Oxman cogently summarized the problems 
as concerning the possible new members' ability to contribute adequately 
equipped forces, the danger of making NATO decision-making mOfe 
difticult, the uncertainty about the Russian and Ukrainian responses to the 
enlargement of the alliance, and doubts about its current members' 
readiness to commit themselves unambiguously to the defense of Eastern 
Europe under any circumstances.'" Although these problems were as 
topical then as they would be four years later, they soon became 
overshadowed by developments that diverted attention from matters of 
substance to malters of appearance. 
At the end of August, Yeltsin during his visit to Warsaw created a stir by 
his impromptu statement suggesting that he had no objections to Polish 
membership in NATO. "Now the West has no argument to say nO to 
Poland," Wal~sa's spokesman Andrzej Drzycimski rejoiced, and Polish 
politicians demanded their country's quick admission into the alliance. "0 As 
Yeltsin continued his tour of Central Europe, his remark in Prague that 
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Russia "has nO right" to hinder the Czechs joining any international 
organization they wanted added to the impression that the Russian 
government would not mind an enlarged NATO.'" This, however, was not 
the case. 
Following Kozyrev's campaign to show that Yeltsin had not really meant 
to say what he was saying, the president dispatched to the key NATO 
governments - those of the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and 
France - letters which, though not public, soon leaked out to the press.'" 
He advanced the specious argument that the 1990 agreement on German 
unification prohibited any expansion of NATO to the east rather than 
merely to East Germany. Insisting that its enlargement without the 
simultaneous admission of Russia was unacceptable, Yeltsin proposed that 
NATO and Russia should become joint guarantors of European security, 
thus making the enlargement of the Western alliance superfluous. m His 
message appeared to be indicative of the ascendancy of those Russian 
hardliners that his foreign minister warned against. 
The October confrontation between Yeltsin and his Parliament seemed 
to offer a telling proof of the dangerous instability of Russian politics. But 
the key role of the armed forces in enabling Yeltsin to face down the 
parliamentary opposition conveyed the wrong impression that they were 
becoming the country's arbiter of power rather than its wasting asset. The 
struggle for power in Moscow nevertheless frightened East Europeans. It 
"makes us cold sweat," commented an associate of Slovak Prime Minister 
Jozef Moravcik, who briefly replaced Meciar as the head of government.'" 
Perceived as a potential threat to European security rather than an event 
of local significance, the showdown in Moscow prompted further Eastern 
European demands for Western reassurance, although opinions about what 
was best to be done varied. Poland, firmly opposed to any Russian security 
guarantees, was alone in adamantly demanding NATO membership. On a 
visit to Washington, Czech foreign minister JoseI' Zieleniec stated that this 
was also his country's long-term objective, but in Prague Prime Minister 
Klaus described NATO as an organization which, having "originated in a 
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bipolar world, has somewhat outlived itself." "It is necessary to watch 
carefully both the possibilities and the aims of other security initiatives," he 
added. '" 
The Moravcik government in Bratislava viewed a rapprochement with 
NATO as more important for its country than its membership in the 
European Union, but considered political rather military rapprochement 
sutficient to prevent Slovak cold sweating.'J(, For Hungary, Jeszenszky 
spoke approvingly about NATO's "continuous and gradual" eastward 
expansion along the French model, by which he meant excluding 
integration of possible new members in the military command structure of 
the alliance. Yet outside the government, foreign affairs commentator 
Gusztav Molmlr recommended to "somehow provoke NATO into accepting 
US."!J7 
Among the Western allies, the French were still quite unwilling to get so 
provoked, whereas the Germans no longer needed a provocation. Paris 
rightly opposed too quick an admission of new members but for dubious 
reasons, while Bonn wrongly pressed for an early enlargement for much 
better reasons. Opposing the enlargement as likely to complicate French 
efforts to break the American domination of the alliance, Prime Minister 
Edouard Balladur advanced his alternative plan for making the European 
Union rather than NATO the centerpiece of the Continent's new security 
structure, but found little interest. 'J ' 
Germany more admirably promoted the enlargement as a way of 
reassuring East Europeans about its intentions. Anxious to dispel their 
concern about looming German hegemony in their region, Bonn dwelt on 
its willingness to share with them the responsibility for maintaining 
common security. Like the French, the Germans were trying to shift the 
focus from defense to preventive diplomacy, but saw an altered NATO 
rather than the European Union as the best vehicle.m According to German 
minister of defense Yolker Rlihe, since the East Europeans' entry into the 
EU had to be delayed for economic reasons they ought to be admitted to 
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the military alliance first.'<!' Since his visit to Prague in October, RUhe most 
actively promoted their cause while trying to reassure the Russians as 
well. loll 
In an effort to influence the December meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council, which was expected to make a basic decision on enlargement, 
Have! restateu forcefully the principal, if debatable, reasons for the Czechs' 
yearning for reassurance. He recalled that in the past no major European 
conflict had bypassed their homeland - as if geographical location Were an 
immutable determinant of security. He proclaimed that his country shared 
and wanted to shape the same values that NATO existed to defend - as if 
the alliance were the same exclusive vehicle for their defense as it used to 
be in the dark days of the Cold War. And he invoked his people's painful 
memory of Munich as a justification for a collective security system based 
on NATO - as if the extraordinary experience of the nineteen-thirties could 
provide reliable guidance in the very different post-Cold War Europe. The 
president summed up that "these countries simply strive to be where they 
fundamentally belong." '42 
The Partnership for Peace project, which emerged from the debates in 
Washington decisively influenced by Gen. Shalikashvili, responded 
perfectly to the East Europeans' diffuse yet fervent strivings for 
reassurance.'" It offered not only to them but also to Russia, as well as to 
any other country in Europe and even former Soviet parts of Asia that 
might care to join, a framework for cooperation short of membership as 
extensive or as limited as they themselves would wish and prove capable of 
making. Taking into account both East European and Russian needs, the 
PFP was well suited to channel the pressure for enlargement, with its vague 
expectations and unpredictable consequences, into the more productive 
practical cooperation conducive to reassurance regardless of formal 
membership. It opened up the promising prospect of different countries 
using NATO's procedures and experiences to gradually acquire the habit of 
settling their conflicting interests and aspirations in a consensual rather 
than confrontational way. Here was what the then U.S. ambassador to the 
United Nations Madeleine Albright aptly described as the "squaring of the 
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circle" by responding all at once to the alliance's need for a new mission, 
Russia's concern about its intentions, and the East Europeans' demand for 
more security. J~4 
The reasons why the PFP's potential was not exhausted while the drive 
toward enlargement gained speed are to be sought in the lack of clarity 
about what exactly was to be accomplished rather than in any deliberate 
shift of priorities. The management of the partnership began inauspiciously 
with the almost off-handed manner in which word about it was first made 
public by U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin at the October meeting of 
NATO defense ministers in Travemlinde.'45 The absence of a clear 
explanation of whether the PFP was intended to facilitate or sidetrack 
admission caused uneasiness in the Visegrad countries. Foreign Minister 
Andrzej Olechowski of Poland wondered aloud whether this was 'Just a 
second Yalta or closes [the] door to NATO membership," leaving Poland 
and its neighbors in a "no man's land," with catastrophic consequences for 
the whole of Europe. "6 Warner's explanation, that NATO did not intend to 
pose the question of the admission of Eastern European countries in the 
near future but did not exclude it either, retlected accurately the uncertainty 
of the PFP's American architects about the direction the project should 
take. 147 
The East Europeans' concern that the PFP might not be enough to 
reassure them increased after a report by Russia's Foreign Intelligence 
Service, published at the end of November, stated bluntly that any 
enlargement of NATO was inimical to Russia's interests and might compel 
it to radically revise its defense posture.'" In another few weeks the implied 
threat seemed to assume dramatic proportions following the landslide 
victory of the ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskii in the December 
elections to the Russian Duma. Since it was difficult to estimate whether or 
not he was actually on his way to power, his victory gave the impression 
that Russia was becoming a greater threat to others rather than merely to 
itself. 
As a result, when President Bill Clinton set out for Europe at the 
beginning of 1995 to clarify the Partnership for Peace offer to its 
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prospective recipients, their need for reassurance was acute. Yet since the 
concept had not been sufficiently clarified even in its authors' minds, he 
sounded evasive rather than reassuring: "There's no consensus to expand 
NATO at this time, and we don't want to give the impression that we're 
creating another dividing line in Europe [ ... ]. What we want is a secure 
Europe and a stabk Europe. AmI I think that the proposal that I put forward 
would permit the expansion of NATO, and I fully expect it will." '49 
Wal~sa minced no words by calling the PFP a "loose and one-sided 
concept," "blackmail" rather than partnership, "necktie for a coffin," while 
a Romanian daily described it as a "tiny bone thrown to the hungry of 
Central and Eastern Europe."!.'" When Albright and Shalikashvili came to 
Warsaw to explain that the PFP should not necessarily be regarded as a step 
toward membership, they met with a predictably lukewarm reception. On 
their next stop, in Budapest, Jeszenszky tried to impress upon them that 
there were "no valid historical, political, or strategic reasons that would 
keep Hungary out of NATO." Indeed, the absence of compelling reasons 
against the enlargement was getting to be more important for the 
administration than the presence of compelling reasons/or it. !5! 
Initial Russian applause for the PFP was enough to convince many East 
Europeans that there must be something wrong with the project. Sergei 
Karaganov, deputy director of the Russian Academy's Institute of Europe 
and member of Russia's Presidential Council, noted with satisfaction that 
"we have won the first round."'" Soviet ambassador to Slovakia Sergei 
Iastrzhembskii hailed the PFP for having dispelled Russian fears about a 
new division of Europe. \53 Kozyrev claimed that the PFP was "a step in the 
right direction," for it "is essentially based on our proposals," and Yeltsin 
endorsed it despite the prevailing Russian skepticism about it.'" 
Whatever the East Europeans' grumblings about the inadequacy of the 
project, they soon began to compete with each other in trying to take 
advantage of the opportunities it offered. Romania was the first to formally 
join, barely two weeks after the PFP was launched, and others, including 
former successor states of the Soviet Union and Western European neutrals, 
followed. The Czechs, self-confident in their economic accomplishments, 
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felt encouraged to abandon the Visegnid framework to better position 
themselves for a short route into NATO. At the May 1994 meeting of 
defense ministers in Brussels, Poland's Adm. Piotr Kolodziejczyk was 
alone in criticizing the PFP for its failure to clarify the modalities of 
transition from partnership to membership.'" Yet his country vigorously 
made use of the new po",ibilities for collaboration. In July the Poles 
became the first to !inalize their Individual Partnership Program, going so 
far as to appoint a German general as their adviser. "6 By then it already 
became abundantly clear that the PFP was an unqualified success. 
What had not been such a success was the Clinton administration's 
foreign policy in various trouble spots around the world - from Somalia to 
Bosnia - where it had been criticized for either too much or too little 
activism. With the elections approaching, the president was under growing 
pressure to prove his mastery of foreign affairs, particularly by showing a 
long-term sense of purpose - not an easy matter given his overwhelming 
concern with domestic politics and his propensity for a short-term 
calculation of costs and benefits. In such a situation, the success of the 
Partnership for Peace was well-suited to tempt the president to reach for 
more than it had originally been intended to accomplish. The enlargement 
of NATO promised an aura of statesmanship with seeminglY little effort. 
Washington's embrace of the enlargement idea after a period of 
hesitation has been explained in very different ways. The President's 
supporters have seen a continuity of his commitment from that rainy day on 
April 22, 1993, when Clinton was described as "deeply impressed" by pleas 
for NATO expansion by Eastern European leaders gathered in Washington 
for the inauguration of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. "7 
Unconvinced, some of the administration's critics have been prepared to see 
nothing but a "cynical effort to attract votes from Polish, Czech and 
Hungarian Americans" - an unsubstantiated speculation which exaggerates 
both the size of the ethnic vote and the importance of NATO in determining 
the voters' preferences.'" It was more pertinent that the president, having 
previously made ambiguous statements that could be interpreted as 
implying his commitment to enlargement, had reasons to be worried about 
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his credibility. Even so, the casual manner of the administration's public 
responses to the East Europeans' pressure for clarification showed a 
commitment growing almost as a second thought rather than a result of a 
policy review leading to a firm decision. 
The decision was made, according to The New York Times columnist R. 
W. Apple, Jr., "in characteristic Clinton Administration style, without a 
structured evaluation of competing viewpoints, without political debate, 
and over the initial objections of senior military officers."159 Having 
previously referred to a lack of consensus about the enlargement of the 
alliance, in mid-January 1994 in Prague the president emphasized that he 
himself favored it. In April the previously skeptical Talbott, speaking in 
Warsaw, was already depicting the PFP as the "path leading to NATO" and 
insisting that its enlargement was no longer in doubt. '&i And in July 
Clinton waxed enthusiastic about the prospect during his own visit to the 
Polish capital, describing the remaining question as no longer whether but 
only when. He still disappointed his hosts by not mentioning a timetable. lO ' 
When the following month the activist Richard Holbrooke succeeded 
the more skeptical Oxman as Assistant Secretary of State for European and 
Canadian Affairs, he set out to forge within the administration the missing 
consensus for a policy that had already been decided in principle. Only at 
this late stage did extensive consultations take place between him, Talbott, 
and the Pentagon, which surprisingly abandoned its previous objections. By 
the fall of 1994, Washington was ready to take the lead in pressing the 
NATO allies to rally behind it in support of the enlargement. l6' 
Among America's three key European allies, the French and the British 
harbored misgivings. French President Fran90is Mitterrand warned against 
a hasty admission of new members from Eastern Europe, which the British 
feared might create new divisions on the Continent rather than enhancing 
its security.'" But much though the allies may have fretted about 
Washington's "steamroller policy-making that leaves basic questions 
unanswered", they failed conspicuously to do anything about it.'" Since in 
the past they had often proved quite adept at contesting U.S. positions on 
DEFBJeE S1UDIES 511997 65 
much less important matters, it is difficult to avoid the impression that they 
no longer sufficiently cared about the direction in which the alliance was 
movIng. 
Embarrassed by their own impotence in dealing with the Yugoslav war 
in their own backyard, West Europeans came to regard NATO intervention 
under American leadership as their last hope there. Relying on that 
leadership, they were poorly equipped to question Washington's wisdom 
about the future of the alliance. When its possible enlargement was 
considered at the December 1994 meeting of its foreign ministers, German 
representative Hermann van Richthofen is reported to have criticized the 
Americans for pushing too hard - but only in a confidential dispatch to his 
govemment.J(" An agreement on enlargement in principle was quickly 
reached without even much of a discussion. With the question of whether 
to enlarge thus answered in the affirmative, the conference took up the 
question of when by setting a nine-month timetable for the preparation of a 
study that would specify the criteria and map out the procedure for 
admitting new members as expeditiously as possible. 
In embarking on the course of enlargement, the alliance did not consider 
the more urgent needs of Eastern Europe, whose security was not being 
seriously threatened, nor did it give sufficient attention to the possible 
effects of the process on its own cohesion which, in contrast, was being 
threatened by uncertainty about NATO's mission.'" Instead, the desirability 
of admitting the formerly communist countries was justified by the alleged 
need to ensure their democratization and stability - as if precisely the 
leading candidates had not already demonstrated a firm enough 
commitment to these virtues for their own internal reasons. Moreover, the 
prospect of a very different alliance, concerned with preventive diplomacy 
rather than military effectiveness, was raised without addressing its 
feasibility or necessity in a Europe that had no shortage of international 
organizations designed to keep peace short of the use of force. What NATO 
did address as a matter of high priority aftt!f its December meeting was the 
perceived urgency of reconciling Russia to the enlargement, thus creating a 
problem where none had before existed. 
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"No Friend of Russia" 
Once the December decision had so unexpectedly moved the enlargement 
issue from the realm of noncommittal discussion to that of practical 
politics, the Russian reaction was little short of panic. It was shown in a 
range of desperate suggestions about how the country should respond to the 
suddenly looming prospecl of what Russians invariably referred to as 
"expansion" of the Western alliance. Raising the specter of a "cold peace," 
Yeltsin proposed to counter it by Russia's following the French example by 
joining the political, though not the military, structures of NATO.'''' Not 
quite accurately, Kozyrev observed that neither Moscow nor Washington 
excluded Russian membership, to which Vladimir Kozin, writing in the 
journal Segodllia, saw no alternativeYill Karaganov did see alternatives, 
though none satisfactory. In the case of enlargement, Russia's foremost 
security expert equivocated, Moscow should abandon cooperation with 
NATO or else seek admission, although the alliance was not really needed 
in the first place, for it was bound to be anti-Russian in any variation. if,,) 
Ever since the enlargement question had first been raised, the conviction 
that NATO was "no friend of Russia" united politically articulate Russians 
regardless of their different opinions about other m alters. "" But originally 
few besides diehard generals and ultranationalists like Zhirinovskii 
professed to believe that NATO was a military threat. While the condition 
of the Russian armed forces was going from bad to worse but the illusion 
of their might still held sway, such people publicized extravagant proposals 
for smiting the enemy - from creating a replica of the Warsaw Pact and 
installing nuclear missiles along Russia's periphery to striking NATO bases 
in Western Europe with those missiles and marching troops into the Baltic 
states and beyond. 17l 
Mainstream members of Russia's political class did not pretend to 
believe that NATO was a military threat. Though unequivocally opposed to 
its enlargement as creating political and psychological problems for the 
Russian people, if not for more substantive reasons, they were not 
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excessively worried as long as the alliance seemed to be resisting the East 
Europeans' pressure for admission. Moscow had been reassured by the 
Partnership for Peace, perceiving it as a clever scheme to deflect and 
eventually neutralize that pressure. Yet, acutely aware of Russia's limited 
ability to inlluence Eastern Europe's growing rapprochement with NATO, 
the Yeltsin government all the more emphasized its preference for 
Kozyrev's idea of replacing NATO by an all-European system based on the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In view of the 
condition of Russia's armed forces, its officials remained particularly 
uncertain about whether joining the PFP on Western terms would signal the 
country's supposed strength or its real weakness. 
For former ambassador to Washington Vladimir Lukin, jOining the 
program was tantamount to a "rape" of Russia. The military remained 
deeply suspicious: retired Gen. Viktor Chudov suspected a nefarious 
American plan for world domination to be lurking behind the idea of joint 
exercises with NATO.l72 The Yells in government, incensed by NATO's 
April 1994 bombing of the Bosnian Serb positions at Gorazde without prior 
consultation with Moscow, dragged its feet. It tried to hold its adherence to 
the PFP hostage to the Western acceptance of Russia's role in mediating the 
Yugoslav war. According to Kozyrev, his country was ready for 
cooperation with NATO but only as an equal, for it was not a weak country 
and had no inferiority complexes. m 
Among indications to the contrary, the Russian delegation at the June 
meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in Istanbul put up what 
struck one of the Western participants as "an absolutely Soviet exercise" in 
obstruction, "a pretty bloody affair [and] [ ... ] a disastrous performance for 
the Russians."'" The delegation blocked the adoption of a final 
communique that referred to the PFP as the possible conduit toward full 
NATO membership. A few weeks later Moscow finally signed up for the 
partnership, but failed to achieve the kind of recognition of Russia's special 
status that it desired. Merely acknowledging the country's existence as a 
"major European, international, and nuclear power," NATO particularly 
resisted the demands by the Yellsin government for the creation of a 
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mechanism for automatic consultation on security matters and the adoption 
of a blueprint leading toward the transt()rmation of the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe into the main pillar of the Continent's 
security architecture. 
At the OSCE's September meeting, Russia pushed for the 
metamorphosis of that hapless body into a giant capable of supervising 
NATO, the Western European Union, and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States as well. It submitted a proposal for the establishment of 
an executive council of ten members, among whom Moscow would have 
one of the five permanent seats, but made no headway.'" In anticipation of 
this outcome, Kozyrev had already been preparing, much against the 
opposition of the communist majority in the Duma, a plan for his country's 
cooperation with NATO through the PFP. It was this plan, nearly ready to 
be signed, that became the casualty of the alliance's December 1994 
meeting, where the foreign minister angrily scuttled it in protest against 
NATO's proposed enlargement. 
In trying to explain what happened, director of the Moscow Institute on 
Europe Vasilii Zhurkin blamed the "psychological and political shock" the 
West had administered to his people for engendering among them a 
"feeling that Russia was being betrayed by the same leaders and nations 
that it was just about to join."[7(, But there was a minority opinion that 
rather blamed its own government for the outcome. Wondering why the 
West, in less than a year, adopted a course toward NATO's enlargement 
without exhausting the possibilities of the Partnership for Peace, Sergei 
Osnobishchev faulted Moscow's courtship of the Bosnian Serbs, its search 
for partners among disreputable ex-Soviet clients such as Iraq, its 
procrastination about joining the PFP, its predilection for differing with the 
West on international issues for no good reasons and, not the least, its 
genocidal war in Chechnia. J77 
Yet the truth was that Russia had not figured as the main factor in 
NATO's decision to enlarge - a telling commentary on the former 
superpower's slide to irrelevance. Having revealed the true dimensions of 
its military collapse, the disastrous war in Chechnia not only exposed the 
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fallacy of the Russian imperial threat as a rationale for NATO's 
enlargement. but also highlighted Moscow's impotence in trying to 
persuade the alliance to change its course once the goal had been set for 
other reasons. 
In June 1995. a thoughtful article by junior diplomat Vladimir Frolov 
observed that the country had reached a dead-end. He noted that retaliatory 
measures of military nature against NATO. such as the repudiation of the 
conventional or nuclear arms limitation agreements advocated by some 
Russian generals. were not in Russia's interest any more than the attainment 
of an equal partnership with NATO was within its power. Frolov saw the 
way out in the formulation of clear strategic goals and the conclusion of a 
special treaty with NATO which would include non-aggression pledges 
reinforced by arms limitation agreements and confidence-building 
measures. m 
Meanwhile the accelerated drive for enlargement following the 
publication in September 1995 of the NATO study spelling out the 
conditions for the admission of new members merely elicited increasingly 
angry. but ineffectual. Russian protests. In the campaign leading to the 
Russian presidential elections. Yeltsin dissociated himself from the 
vociferous opponents of NATO. His most important rival. Gen. Aleksandr 
Lebed. took the sensible view that. however distasteful NATO's advance 
might be to the Russians. the best way to minimize its effects was not to 
worry about it too much. On his visit to Brussels. the outspoken general 
told his NATO hosts that "whatever NATO decides. Russia is not going to 
go into hysterics. [ ... ] The main thing is not to hurry. or you may trip Up."'79 
Elsewhere he commented that if the NATO states wanted to be so foolish as 
to spend billions of dollars to enlarge so they could better face the 
nonexistent Russian threat, that was their business. 
After his re-election. Yeltsin took a more active stand against NATO's 
plans. Taking the December 1996 decision by the North Atlantic Council to 
postpone the invitation of new members without setting a firm date as 
evidence of the alliance's sensitivity to Russian objections, Moscow 
stepped up its anti-enlargement campaign. It impressed the outside world 
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by creating the appearance of an all but unanimous Russian opposition 
against the project. Yet the reality was that in Russia, much like in the 
West, the issue stirred [he elites while most other people did not care. 
In early 1996, polls found 30 per cent Russians to believe that NATO's 
expansion hurt their national interests while only 10 per cent saw no harm; 
by far the largest proportion of the population voiced no opinion. When 
asked about what ought to be done about NATO's plans, 35 per cent of 
respondents did not know, 31 favored obstructing them, and no fewer than 
22 per cent thought that Russia should itself join the alliance. "" The true 
picture was that of confusion rather than of consensus. 
A defining feature of Europe's new security environment, Russia's 
decline as a great power was not within NATO's capacity to reverse. Much 
as in Soviet times, the root causes of Russian insecurity were internal, and 
could therefore not be allayed by any amount of assurances about the 
alliance's peaceful intentions. Yet, as the decision to invite new members 
approached, the unattainable task of reassuring Russia became NATO's 
foremost priority. Its pursuit opened up for Moscow an opportunity [0 make 
strength out of its weakness by extracting from the alliance concessions 
that otherwise would have been impossible to obtain. 
Self-Differentiation and Self-Selection 
In determining the NATO candidates' qualilications for membership, their 
attitude could make a difference. The Baltic states surpassed all others in 
the consistency with which they regarded the Western alliance, rather than 
any other creation, as the only suitable safeguard of their security. Their 
striving to forge ever closer links with NATO, promoted by their active 
participation in the PFP, was encouraged by their Nordic neighbors, 
although initially only Denmark favored their admission as members. Other 
Nordic countries offered help, including assistance in building their armed 
forces. Sweden under Prime Minister Carl Bildt even asserted a special 
security interest by borrowing the Russian term to describe the Baltic states 
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as its Own "near abroad." Summing up their case, Latvian president Guntis 
Ulmanis referred to NATO's presence in the area as "a historical necessity 
and a geopolitical imperative."llIl 
In contrast to the Baltic countries, none of the Soviet Union's other 
succeSSor states had before 1997 indicated an intention join NATO. 
Ukraine viewed its possible extension with trepidation, fcaring that its 
eastward advance could prompt Moscow to apply pressure on Kiev to look 
to Russia for protection, thus diminishing Ukraine's newly won 
independence. 'Rl Moldova, likewise mindful of its vulnerable geographical 
location, dramatized by the presence of Russian troops in its breakaway 
Transdniestria district, enshrined its preference for neutrality in its 
constitution. m Belarus - or, more precisely, its eccentric president 
Alyeksandr Lukashenka - sought to "out-Russian" the Russians by not only 
advocating the formation of a military alliance under their leadership but 
also offering his country's territory for the possible deployment of their 
nuclear missiles, to be targeted on NATO's prospective Eastern European 
members. In a calmer mood, he resuscitated the former Soviet proposal for 
a nuclear-free zone in the region as an alternative to the extension of the 
Western alliance. Meanwhile he wanted to keep the Russian SS-25 missiles 
as a hedge, but was undercut in November by Moscow's compliance with 
its commitment to withdraw them.1H-I 
Although nearly all of the Soviet succesSOr states joined the Partnership 
for Peace, with the exception of the Baltic states they tended to regard it as 
the limit of their collaboration with NATO, while the East Europeans saw it 
as a barely adeguate beginning. Disparaging the PFP as an exercise in 
hypocrisy, a Romanian newspaper accused NATO of having "washed its 
hands like Pontius Pilate" and left the countries of the region in a limbo of 
"self-differentiation" and "self-selection."'" This was indeed a fair 
description of what they were actually doing, in contrast to the many 
cliches about their overwhelming desire to join NATO. 
In the Balkans, the Yugoslav war pitted NATO's enemies, most 
outstandingly the Serbs, against its real or pretended friends from among all 
other peoples. Rightly regarding the alliance as the only force capable of 
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thwarting their aggressive ambitions, Serb nationalists expressed their 
hatred of it in theatrical hyperbole. They referred to the international 
embargo of their country as the creation of a "concentration camp" guarded 
by NATO troops, to the United Nations as an instrument for NATO's step-
by-step conquest of the world, and to the NATO bombing of Bosnia as a 
replication of Nazi atrocities. 186 Once the bombing succeeded in finally 
stopping the war there, the Serbian Writers' Association hoisted a black 
flag at its Belgrade headquarters, wailing that "the Serbs' weeping now 
reaches to the stars." 
Not without reason, the Serbs blamed NATO for assisting the Croat 
conquest of Krajina in August 1995. The Croats, as well as the Bosnian 
Muslims, had long been trying to have the ineffective UN peacekeeping 
force replaced by a NATO force, and finally succeeded. As the enemy of 
their enemy, the alliance was their friend, although their attitude toward it 
was ambivalent. On the one hand, they needed it for support and 
protection; On the other hand, they resented its commitment to a fair peace 
settlement, which they sought to circumvent. Neither Croatia, with its 
authoritarian regime contemptuous of European human rights standards, 
nor Bosnia-Herzegovina, whose very viability as a state remained 
uncertain, were eligible candidates for NATO membership, and they did 
not try to pretend otherwise. Nor was Albania such a candidate although it 
did unsuccessfully apply for admission, besides vainly urging NATO to 
dispatch a peacekeeping force to protect the Albanian population in the 
Serbian province of KoSOVO.' 87 In May 1993 Macedonia announced that it 
was going to apply, but it never did. IK" 
Slovenia's desire to dissociate itself from the other heirs of the former 
Yugoslavia by dwelling On its Central European heritage was an important 
initial motive in its bid for NATO membership. Once the idea became 
topical in 1995, there could be no question about the support it enjoyed 
among a substantial majority of the population or about the capacity of the 
country, whose per capita domestic income exceeded that of NATO 
members Portugal or Greece, to sustain the costs of membership.'"' No 
could there be a doubt about the ability of the tiny Slovenian army, which 
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was being built from scratch to conform to NATO standards, to smoothly 
integrate into the alliance. The pertinent questions rather were whether 
Slovenia, facing no security threats despite its proximity to the Balkan 
killing fields, really needed the membership or whether, considering the 
small size of its territory and population, the alliance needed a member 
whose only substantive contribution could arguably be providing an 
overland connection between Italy and NATO's other possible member, 
Hungary. This geographical asset, however, was more valuable in theory 
than in any easily imaginable strategic scenario. 
Relative strategic insignificance also detracted from the much less 
convincing bid for membership by Romania, pursued by the unreformed 
postcommunist regime of President Ion IJiescu mainly as a public relations 
enterprise. With an uneasy eye on neigh boring Hungary's thriving 
rapprochement with the alliance, the Romanian leader insisted that no 
country should be given preferential treatment for admission, while at the 
same time trying to ensure that Romania would not be left behind. Not only 
was Romania the first to join the Partnership for Peace, describing itself as 
getting "from the bottom of the queue to the steering wheel,"'''' hut it also 
managed to impress visiting NATO officers with the professional 
competence of its armed forces - no small accomplishment for an army that 
had only recently been reputed as the worst in the Warsaw Pact.'" 
Nor were the Romanian public opinion polls, which scored as much as 
95 per cent support for NATO membership, necessarily reliable in a 
country long notorious for the skill of its ruling cliques in manipulating a 
politically inexperienced citizenry. According to the opposition newspaper 
Tilleretulliber, the PFP fitted "the interest of the current political 
establishment in Bucharest like a perfect glove"; just as NATO did not 
intend to spread its security umbrella over Romania, its regime did not 
seriously want to join the alliance, only to drum up "solidarity around a 
general and harmless idea."'" In trying to break its intemational isolation 
while deflecting outside scrutiny of its domestic practices, the regime 
advertised the adaptation of its armed forces to NATO standards and their 
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participation in peacekeeping operations from Bosnia to Albania. "We are 
going up like a rocket," Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu boasted in 
October 1996."" 
Trying to steal a cause from the democratic opposition, which alone 
favored NATO membership in good faith, !liescu posed as a champion of 
Romania's national interests in seeking its integration into Europe, while 
preparing to benefit from the probable rejection of the country's 
membership application. Both the ultranationalist and the communist 
supporters of his government paid lip service to NATO, while resenting it, 
respectively, as a threat to Romania's national identity and an obstacle to its 
friendship with Russia. !liescu's adviser Ion Mircea Pascu, who as secretary 
of state for defense policy and international relations was managing 
Bucharest's bid for admission into NATO, was widely regarded as a 
manipulator primarily concerned with shoring up the regime's eroding 
power base. 19.J 
Similarly shady, if less skillful, maneuvering against political rivals gave 
the characteristically ambivalent f1avor to the expressions of interest in 
NATO membership by the Metiar government in Slovakia. His regime 
shared with its Romanian counterpart both its authoritarian proclivities and 
its nationalist ambitions, besides common concern about the Hungarian 
competition. Having enlisted the same incongruous support from right-
wing nationalists and unreformed communists, Meciar earned the 
distinction of being the only leader of a former Warsaw Pact country who 
ostentatiously sympathized with Russia's anti-enlargement campaign, for 
which Slovakia received Moscow's praise as well as the promise of 
lucrative contracts.'95 In trying to counter the opposition charges of 
gratuitously pushing the country to the east rather than the west, he 
professed enthusiasm for NATO membership.'9b He alternately suggested 
that the membership was all but certain and that it was not because the 
alliance did not really want the Slovaks. 
Public opinion in Slovakia, more reliably measured than in Romania, 
showed by September 1996 as many as 70 percent of the people favoring 
membership, yet most of them did not believe that their government was 
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actually leading them toward that goal.'" Their skepticism appeared 
substantiated by the Meciar regime's response to Western criticism of its 
authoritarian practices. After a meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defense 
William Perry, the Prime Minister insisted that "during negotiations with 
representatives of foreign countries, Slovakia should not act like a student 
standing in front of a teacher, waiting for assessmenl of his behavior. "1911 As 
it became increasingly obvious that the country did not meet the 
requirement of democratic politics set by NATO for the admission of new 
members, the ruling party's newspaper accused the alliance of using double 
standards, citing Turkish repression of the Kurds and the release by the 
Italian court of a Nazi war criminal as examples. With Slovakia becoming a 
laughing stock as a "bride whom no one wants,"'" Meciar seemed at a loss 
about whether it was better to try to blame his domestic enemies for 
blocking the door to NATO or to deprecate the membership as unimportant. 
In a reversal of the Slovak situation, the Czech government had by 1996 
firmly made up its mind in favor of NATO membership, but the people 
were not nearly as convinced about its merits as most Slovaks were. 
Among the prospective candidates. the Czech Republic was the only 
country where public opinion polls showed a declining support for joining 
NATO just as the issue was becoming increasingly topical. The proportion 
of those in favor fell from 54 per cent in March 1995 to 46 per cent a year 
later and, according to a different survey, to as low as 38 per cent at the 
time the North Atlantic Council met in December 1996 to discuss the 
schedule of issuing invitations."" The percentage of the people willing to 
bear the higher cost of defense at the expense of welfare was even lower, 
only one in lifteen Czechs. This was the lowest figure in the region, 
lending support to the estimate by the director of NATO affairs in the 
Prague ministry of defense that the "Czechs feel secure. They are occupied 
by private problems and [ ... ] are not informed about NATO.""" 
While declining defense expenditures and drastic reductions of the 
armed forces were common to all former Warsaw Pact countries except 
Romania, in the Czech Republic they also reflected widespread 
indifference besides what Havel perceived as "the public's diminishing trust 
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in the army."'" "People say our army never fought for our country," noted 
the above-quoted Czech ministry of defense official."" Although the Czech 
Republic, having been the first to respond to the conditions NATO had set 
for the admission of new members, vowed to spend on defense no less than 
other states of comparable size - and proceeded spending proportionately 
one-third more than Poland or Hungary - the condition of its army 
continued to worsen."" In January 1997, the nation's most respected 
opinion magazine commented that "only fools would seem to be interested 
in such an army" as an ally."" The official Czech document on defense 
doctrine was only adopted in December 1996; vague about the threats the 
country might be facing, it was silent about the kind of weaponry needed to 
cope with them. 
In July 1995, chairman of the foreign affairs committee in the Prague 
parliament Jiff Payne criticized his colleagues on the defense committee for 
their lack of interest in military affairs."16 A year later, Czech politicians 
sti 11 remained confused about the obligations attendant to NATO 
membership. Some of them mistook the alliance's requirement that its 
members permit overtlights of their territory by nuclear-armed aircraft for 
the demand for stationing nuclear weapons on the ground. Hence also the 
government prepared to enact the country's non-nuclear status similar to 
Norway's as if this were not what NATO envisaged for Eastern Europe in 
the first place.'" 
Exploiting the people's persisting anti-German prejUdices, left-wing 
critics of enlargement insinuated that it was a German scheme to sacrifice 
Czechs as "geopolitical victims" by building a glacis that would prevent 
Germany from becoming a "frontline state. "'"" Opponents of NATO 
membership constituted a majority within the nation's largest opposition 
party, the Social Democracy. The party committed itself to submitting the 
issue to a referendum, the likelihood of which increased after the Social 
Democrats' success in the July 1996 national elections. 
Hungary had been mure successful than the Czech Republic in 
promoting its eligibility as an ally despite its only marginally higher 
percentages of citizens unequivocally supportive of NATO membership and 
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their similar skepticism about the condition as well as the worth of the 
nation's army. At least the popular support for NATO was not declining but 
rising, especially once the initial resentment at the presence of its forces on 
Hungarian territory for deployment in former Yugoslavia gave way to their 
enthusiastic reception."w Hungary's relations with the alliance further 
benefited from the replacement of its right-of-center government, whose 
followers' ultranationalist pronouncements had sometimes raised Western 
eyebrows, with a left-of-center coalition led by reformed communists. The 
new government proved more capable than its predecessor of settling the 
country's differences with its neighbors - one of the key preconditions of 
admission into NATO. 
The origins of Hungarian-Romanian rapprochement date back to 1990, 
when the two governments responded to the idea of an "open skies" 
agreement by initiating mutual aerial surveillance leading to extensive 
collaboration between their militaries.2Io The desire for better relations was 
the result of a pragmatic conviction that they were in both nations' best 
interest, rather than of any opportunistic calculation to meet the criteria for 
NATO membership - which only became topical later. Still, the landmark 
treaty of September 1996, which settled the status of Romania's huge 
Hungarian minority, inevitably had a salutary effect on both countries' 
international standing. And Hungary's standing further increased when it 
concluded a similar treaty with Slovakia; the belated ratification of the 
treaty by the Slovaks and their reluctance to put its provisions into effect 
could properly be blamed on them. All this time, the seriousness of the 
Hungarian discourse about NATO membership contrasted favorably with 
the frivolous handling of that subject by Bratislava. 
Yet Hungary never went so far as Poland in systematically preparing 
itself for membership in the alliance. The Poles took pains to make 
themselves, as the 1966 declaration by leading defense and foreign affairs 
officials of their different governments put it, "members even before the 
fact,":!]] thus trying to make it all but impossible for the alliance to refuse 
them. This policy was pursued by all Polish governments, regardless of 
their political coloration, ever since Warsaw abandoned its flirtation with 
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neutrality in 1991. It was embraced enthusiastically by most former 
communists and flourished after the election of one of them, Aleksander 
Kwasniewski, as president. By finally subordinating the military to civilian 
control, he ended the embarrassing controversy gratuitously initiated by his 
predecessor Wal/i'sa's attempt to manipulate the general staff. 
In its wooing of NATO, Warsaw even expressed its readiness to allow 
the stationing of foreign troops and nuclear weapons on Polish territory if 
the alliance wanted this.'" Styling itself as the leader of a "club of active 
NATO partners," Poland set an example to others by hosting the first 
international maneuvers under the PFP auspices; codenamed "Cooperative 
Bridge '94," the maneuvers brought together troops from thirteen countries 
under joint U.S.-Polish command.2iJ The Polish army cultivated its close 
collaboration with the German Bundeswehr, and although the full effect of 
the brotherhood-in-arms on the brotherhood of hearts could not be easily 
determined, Poland's rapport with NATO's key European member 
contrasted favorably with the frequently tense Czech-German relationship. 
Encouraged by relations with Bonn developing more ·satisfactorily than 
those with Moscow, Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz expressed 
particular satisfaction at Germany's support for enlargement.''' 
Alone among the candidates for NATO membership, Poland in 
February 1996 adopted a long-term plan for the adaptation of its armed 
forces to achieve their integration into the alliance over a period of five 
years, including the estimated costs. It expressed its readiness to act on 
NATO's defense planning questionnaires within two to three years. It 
prepared a 22-page discussion paper for conversations with the alliance's 
sixteen ambassadors, and once the talks started, Deputy Minister of 
Defense Andrzej Karkoszka was pleased to note that "we were the ones 
who 'cross-examined' the NATO representatives."2IS 
Despite the Poles' reputation for military prowess, their armed forces, 
starved for funding and burdened with obsolescent Soviet-era equipment, 
leave much to be desired. The reports about recruits having to practice 
grenade throwing with beer cans because of the shortage of the real thing 
may have been invented, but otherwise the condition of the Polish armed 
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forces is hardly better than that of the Czech or Hungarian ones.216 Yet their 
deficiencies need not make much difference if Czech Prime Minister Klaus 
was right in his estimate that the condition of military equipment was 
"really secondary," since the question of joining NATO was a political 
one.217 After all, the Czechs reasoned, NATO seemed mainly interested in 
small military units for peacekeeping operations, and in that role the 
Eastern European contingents serving in former Yugoslavia acquitted 
themselves fairly wel1. 2lK As Secretary of Defense Perry described it - for 
better or for worse - "the future of NATO is being shaped in Bosnia."219 
As the enlargement decision approached, polls showed the far from 
overwhelming majority of 53 per cent of East Europeans wanting their 
countries to join NAT0210 Yet more instructive than this total were the 
national tigures indicative of the self-differentiation and self-selection that 
had taken place. Only in Poland was membership in the alliance supported 
by a clear consensus of the elites and the people alike, thus warranting 
Kwasniewski's unsuccessful attempt in the summer of 1996 to convince 
Clinton that his country should be admitted before others. Elsewhere the 
commitment to the alliance, quite apart from the qualifications for 
membership, was not nearly as unequivocal as in Poland. The challenge to 
NATO leaders was how the considerable differences among the applicants 
could best be reconciled with the interests of the alliance and the security of 
Europe as a whole. 
Rush to Madrid 
The slowing down of enlargement preparations as a result of the 
inconclusive outcome of the December 1996 session of the North Atlantic 
Council worried East Europeans while encouraging Russian hopes that the 
drive might still be reversed. Secretary of State Warren Christopher's public 
suggestion in September 1996, that the invitation of new members be 
postponed until 1997, was seen by Moscow as an early signal that its 
opposition to the plan would be heeded. NATO's subsequent decision to do 
as Christopher had suggested could then be interpreted as an attempt to 
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delay the enlargement, perhaps indefinitely, particularly in view of the 
simultaneous establishment of the Atlantic Partnership Council, suitable for 
promoting consultation short of membership. Judging wrongly that the 
wind was blowing from Brussels rather than from Washington, Yeltsin's 
entourage welcomed the "sensible views" that seemed to be prevailing Over 
the "NATO bureaucracy's egoistical desire to speed up the alliance's 
expansion." 
While united against the expansion, Russian officials and politicians 
were divided in their opinions about what to do about it. In trying to 
prevent it, some wanted to penalize the West by making its relations with 
Russia even mme difficult. Others, resigned to the inevitability of 
enlargement, merely wanted to cut Russian losses. They believed that its 
effects could be better nullified, or at least mitigated, by influencing NATO 
from within through cooperation rather than confrontation, as advocated by 
Lebed. 2" The communist chairman of the Duma security committee Viktor 
IIiukhin thundered that nuclear missiles should be retargeted on Eastern 
Europe.''' But the National Security Council secretary lvan Rybkin thought 
it better to join NATO, except for its integrated command, so that Moscow 
would be consulted in all its important decisions. 
This time the Yeltsin government reacted to the likely growth of NATO 
more coherently than it had done before. Despite playing a weak hand, 
Moscow acted purposefully to make the best of the situation. Kozyrev's 
successor Evgenii Primakov restated his country's opposition to 
enlargement but indicated a willingness to discuss it. He praised Western 
readiness to renegotiate the conventional forces agreement with the goal of 
better accommodating Russia's special security interests in the Caucasus, 
shattered by its defeat in Chechnia. At the same time, Minister of Defense 
Rodionov put in question his government's continued willingness to 
collaborate in the dismantling of the former superpowers' nuclear arsenals -
more urgent a security issue than the enlargement of NATO. Warning that 
all the multilateral arms control treaties could be invalidated by the 
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emergence of new zones of confrontation, he harked at the Western 
alliance's alleged aggressiveness in terms "reminiscent of Soviet-style 
rhetoric. ":m 
Having in fact become committed to enlargement much more deeply 
than the Russians wanted to believe, the Clinton administration felt that 
much greater the need to reassure them about NATO's peaceful intentions -
as generations of Western leaders had tried to do in vain in Soviet times. 
The need appeared to be even greater after the appointment as Secretary of 
State of the Czech-born Madeleine Albright elicited the grumpy Russian 
commentary that "Moscow would be genuinely surprised if Ms. Albright 
shows an understanding of its worries about NATO's eastward 
expansion."'" Emotions ran high as disaffected Sevastopol admirals and 
generals sent an open letter to Yeltsin urging him "not to sign" the START 
II treaty, which Russia had already signed in 1993, and re-build its 
obsolescent nuclear arsenal. Even the president's star reformer Anatolii 
Chubais hinted darkly that enlargement would trigger "serious changes" in 
Russia which, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin warned, would mean 
that "the tanks will start rolling out" from the factories again.'" 
Despite the emptiness of such threats in a country whose economy was 
still collapsing, whose central government was incapable of enforcing its 
will in much of the land, and whose army had all but ceased to exist as a 
fighting-force, the artificially fomented "anti-NATO hysteria" made an 
impact. It did not affect so much ordinary Russians, of whom no more than 
a third shared the elite's concern about NATO's expansion while 45 per cent 
refused to be worried."6 But the hysteria intluenced Western policy, still 
based on the fallacious premise that Russia's recovery as a great power waS 
historically inevitable rather than increasingly improbable. 
Overrating both the need to reconcile Moscow with the enlargement and 
the possibility of actually achieving that goal, the Clinton administration 
negotiated the agreement signed in Paris on May 27,1997, under the 
pompous name of "The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, 
and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation." Far from 
creating the foundations of a satisfactory relationship, the agreement 
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provided for the establishment of a joint Cooperation Council of ill-defined 
competence, whose role was viewed very differently by each side. While 
they both agreed on the desirability of its ensuring that nothing in the 
alliance's decisions would contradict Russia's vital interests, what 
Washington regarded as an expression of political good will was seen by 
Moscow as a binding commitment under international law. I-lence Russia, 
but not the United States, intended to submit the document to parliamentary 
ratification. '127 
In effect, Russia was given less than the right of veto, but more than the 
right to merely express its opinion about matters concerning the Western 
alliance. As the first of NATO's subsidiaries, the Council could possibly be 
manipulated to influence its decisions against the wishes of its members. 
The tripartite chairmanship is to consist of one representative of the NATO 
states chosen annually on a rotating basis, the Secretary General, and a 
Russian delegate appointed by his government without a time limitation, 
thus giving Moscow a disproportionate weight because of the continuity of 
its representation. Its ability to shape the Council's agenda was further 
strengthened by the decision that the three co-chairmen take turns in 
chairing sessions separately rather than preside as a group,22l! 
Primakov understandably hailed the Founding Act as a "great victory" 
for his country and, for less obvious reasons, the "world community." For 
their part, East Europeans resented the paradox that Russia was given a 
better opportunity than NATO's prospective new members to influence the 
alliance's decisions. Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati of Poland demanded 
for his country the right to be represented on the Council. 22'J It was not true, 
as The Washington Post wanted to believe, that after the signing of the 
treaty "all the wind went out of anti-NATO bluster" in Moscow."" Taking a 
longer view, the Ukrainian historian Ihor Torbakov grasped better that the 
document left more questions open than it answered.''' 
The nearer the July Madrid 1997 meeting where NATO was expected to 
invite some of the candidates, the greater was their rush to press their 
arguments for admission. While the Baltic states insisted that a Europe that 
would leave them at Russia's mercy by barring them from NATO could 
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never be secure, Slovenia dwelt on its unique qualifications for 
membership as the only candidate that did not meet with Russian 
objections. At the beginning of 1997, the two Balkan states whose previous 
crypto-communist governments had effectively disqualified them - Bulgaria 
and Romania - began to vigorously knock on NATO's door after their 
recent election had brought to power governments with democratic 
credentials. They both advanced the specious argument that NATO needed 
them to close its alleged strategic missing link in the Balkans. 
Of the two, Romania's tirst democratically elected government in its 
history launched a campaign designed to appeal to the NATO members 
presumed to be sympathetic on account of linguistic aftinity - France, Italy, 
Spain, Belgium. The emotions aroused by the campaign showed how much 
the question of NATO membership had become divorced from tangible 
security considerations and intertwined with vague perceptions of national 
identity. For the 90 per cent of Romanians who, according to public 
opinion surveys, c1amored for the membership, at issue was nothing less -
and possibly nothing more - than international recognition of their rightful 
place in Europe. Invoking the alleged debt owed by the West to compensate 
the Romanians for the ordeal of communism, the demagogic Bucharest 
press warned that Madrid would be "another Yalta" if Romania were not 
invited. President Emil Constantinescu had difficulty explaining that "there 
are no historic debts to be called in," that NATO was not a charity, and that 
its members were expected not only to require but also to provide 
security.232 
The support that the Romanian, as well as Slovenian, candidacy 
received from not only France and Italy but also from some of the alliance's 
other members suggested that the president's criteria may have been more 
rigorous than NATO's own. Many of the allies no longer seemed to favor a 
definition of NATO as a special-purpose defensive alliance rather than an 
instrument for building a greater Europe, as former U.S. national security 
adviser Gen. Brent Scowcroft did.'33 Instead they appeared to be attracted 
to Havel's stirring, if nebulous, vision of NATO as a protector against local 
flareups of "tribal passions" in a Europe made into a single political entity. 
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"It is not a matter of the United States being called up to defend a small 
country"'" in Eastern Europe, the Czech president predicted, implying that 
NATO members' commitment to stand by each Olher unconditionally 
should no longer be taken seriously. If new members were to be admiued 
with the understanding that they would not have to be defended, the 
definition of the alliance would indeed be fundamentally alteredY:'i 
On the eve of the Madrid meeting, more important than the all but 
certain invitation of three countries - after the Clinton administration made 
public its backing of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary - was the 
question of whether more should be invited at the same time and the 
prospect be kept open for the admission of still more later on. After 
Secretary of Defense Perry's undiplomatic statement the year before that 
the Baltic states were not ready for admission because of their inability to 
meet an attack by force, Washington was especially eager to reassure 
them 2 " It consequently gave assurances that the prospect of further 
admissions was open, without giving due attention to the implications for 
the inner workings of the alliance. 
After meeting with U.S. officials, Latvian foreign minister Valdis 
Birkavs was able to acknowledge American support for a "process that has 
to remain, and we are sure will remain, inclusive," expressing his belief that 
NATO's enlargement will not be complete until the Baltic states [ ... J are 
members of the alliance."'" Now also Ukraine, contrary to previous signals 
from Kiev, began showing interest in membership. Following a call by 
Ukrainian politicians that their country, too, should eventually be admitted 
to NATO, President Leonid Kuchma together with Have[ issued a joint 
statement to that effect, declaring that the alliance should be "open to all 
interested countries which are ready for membership."'" Making eligibility 
rather than need the main criterion for enlargement opened up a prospect of 
NATO's taking in new members with no end in sight until all of Europe, 
with the possible exception of Russia, would belong, thus making the 
alliance into a superfluous replica of the OSCE. 
However, this dismal prospect does not necessarily have to materialize. 
An alternative development has been under way that, if continued, might be 
Of;FfNCE STUDIES 5/1997 85 
more suitable to meet the different countries' most urgent new security 
needs. On May 28 the presidents of the Baltic states, Poland, and Ukraine 
met in Tallinn to discuss the potentially adverse repercussions of the 
NATO-Russia agreement. While reaffirming their support for open 
admissions, they appropriately focused their attention on closer economic 
cooperation with one another.2W In supplementing the East-West context of 
the NATO enlargement with an innovative North-South dimension, they 
were followed a week later by Turkey's president Suleiman Demirel 
visiting the Baltic capitals."[) While Turkey's support for the Baltic states' 
entry into the alliance served primarily to advance its own difficult bid for 
admission into the European Union, the visit showed the potential for 
regional cooperation between NATO and non-NATO countries along 
Russia's western border regardless of the enlargement. 
The expressed U.S. intention to conclude special security treaties with 
the Baltic states, besides NATO's treaty with Ukraine modeled after that 
with Russia, could likewise be regarded as a durable alternative to 
enlargement rather than its temporary substitute. Much would depend on 
how the alliance would want to utilize the new Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council, the joint NATO-PFP forum created shortly before Madrid with the 
stated goal of merging military cooperation and political dialogue.'" 
At the July Madrid meeting, however, which Secretary General Javier 
Solana appropriately described as NATO's "defining moment,"'" the 
alliance notably failed to define its future character. Although it extended 
the expected invitations to the three Central European countries, it did so 
while a majority of its members unsuccessfully lobbied for inviting two 
more.'43 Unable to resolve their differences beforehand, the allies left open 
the important question of whether the first round of invitations should soon 
be followed by another or rather be used to delay any more rounds. Nor did 
they make it any clearer which, if any, of the countries that had been left 
out now should be brought in later and on what grounds. Their uncertainty 
rellected their indecision about whether the alliance should remain the 
same or, as its members' widening range of opinions about its purpose 
seemed to show, should rather become something different. Later that 
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summer the operetta sight of mighty NATO trying to play umpire between 
two rowdy factions of Bosnian Serbs in the city of Banja Luka suggested 
what the difference might be. 
Already the U.S. resistance to France's pressure for admitting five new 
members, including Romania and Slovenia, prompted Paris to serve notice 
that it WOllld not pay the costs of admission even of the three. So far, to be 
sure, no reliable calculation had been made of what those costs might be, 
the estimates ranging from as little as $27 billion by the administration to as 
much as $125 billion by the Congressional Budget Office.'" In one expert's 
opinion, the East Europeans "need only make their current forces 
interoperable with NATO, meaning providing English-language courses, 
changing air defense and command-and-control procedures, and perhaps 
purchasing communication equipment."'" If such enlargement on the cheap 
were to happen, applying the Iceland or Luxembourg model to a country 
like Poland, it would on paper provide first-rate protection in return for 
little more than a token contribution, but in reality would cast doubt on the 
value of the protection. 
No sooner did the three candidate countries receive their invitations 
than their governments pledged solidarity with the three Baltic states, 
vowing to press the alliance for their early admission."(' Moreover, they 
declared that Slovakia, which had in May 1997 aborted a farcical 
referendum designed by the Meciar government to demonstrate popular 
support for its reservations about the alliance, should be speedily admitted 
into NATO and the EU as well. Such vigorous special pleading, intended to 
ensure that the alliance would keep looking east rather than south - from 
where its main challenges are more likely to be coming - augured ill for 
NATO's future ability to build consensus with its new members. With 
Romania reaffirming its "irrevocable desire'I2·17 to join and others given 
incentives to follow, Russian ambassador to Washington Iulii Vorontsov 
could plausibly predict that the enlargement would eventually destroy 
NATO by undoing its consensus.'" Thus NATO would itself accomplish 
what Soviet leaders had in vain tried to accomplish for forty years - an apt 
revenge for its contribution to the demise of their state. 
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Saving the Alliance 
In pondering the merits of NATO's enlargement, the U.S. Senate and the 
parliaments of the alliance's other countries, whose unanimous ratification 
is needed for the project to be implemented, should be aware of where the 
real risks lie. They do not lie in encouraging the rise of the imaginary 
Russian threat - the specter invoked much too often by both the critics of 
the enlargement and its supporters, still haunted by the Cold War scenario. 
There are far greater risks involved in NATO's enlarging itself out of 
recognition, thus ceasing to exist as an effective alliance long before the 
putative recovery of imperialist Russia, yet too soon before more plausible 
threats, possibly necessitating the use of its unique military capability, 
could be ruled out. With good luck, such threats may not materialize, but 
banking on this best-case scenario would hardly be more prudent than 
preparing for the worst. 
The unnecessary complication could have been avoided if the issue of 
enlargement had not been posed in the first place, for Europe, after all, is 
remarkably secure as it is. But since the issue has been posed, and pushed 
too far for a reversal to be possible without adverse consequences, the 
question is how to mitigate the consequences without running greater risks. 
If the enlargement can no longer be stopped it could still be brought under 
control by being carefully limited with the goal of suspending the process 
while absorbing one country as a member and proceeding with alternative 
security arrangements for others. 
Among the NATO applicants, Poland is the only one that has 
unambiguously demonstrated its potential of becoming not only a consumer 
but also a provider of security. It alone has systematically striven for 
admission by preparing itself for both the privileges and the obligations of 
membership, while showing a consistency of commitment by the elites as 
well as the public at large, Because of its size and location, Poland is 
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strategically more important for Europe than other countries of the region. 
Without being discriminatory, its separate admission can be justified as an 
exception for all these reasons that place Poland in a class by itself. 
Despite the deficiencies of its armed forces, Poland is better prepared 
than others to bring them up to NATO standards not only symbolically but 
also effectively. They enjoy popular respect, their officer corps has been 
purged of communist holdovers, and civilian control has been established. 
Their integration into NATO is a task that could reasonably be expected to 
be accomplished within a relatively short time at acceptable cost, thus 
making them ready to substantially contribute to any military operation 
NATO might be required to undertake. 
Justifiable on its own merits, the admission of Poland, but not of any 
additional countries for the time being, need not be seen by Russia as either 
a concession or a provocation. While unlikely to please extreme Russian 
nationalists, it would be suited to reassure the more moderate Russians 
alarmed about an ever-encroaching NATO by marking not the beginning 
but the end of its advance for the foreseeable future. In preparing for 
Poland's admission, NATO could negotiate, informally rather than formally, 
for an assurance of Russian self-restraint in regard to the Baltic states in 
return for its own self-restraint on Polish territory - mutually reinforcing 
pledges that would enhance security in the area. 
Specific security concerns of countries whose admission into NATO 
lacks a compelling rationale could then be addressed, with due attention to 
their different needs, in bilateral treaties with NATO and, if appropriate, 
with some of its individual members as well. Already such a treaty has been 
signed between the alliance and Ukraine; in addition, the United States 
envisages conduding one with the Baltic states, while Great Britain has 
signaled a willingness to develop a special security relationship with 
Estonia. 
Such treaties would help reduce to normality the artificial exceptionality 
of NATO's "founding" treaty with Russia, thus discouraging its being used 
for unwarranted interference in the affairs of the alliance. The downgrading 
of that treaty would conform with the probability of Russia's evolution into 
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an important but not great European power - one, perhaps, on the order of 
Spain, with which it is likely to share in the future both extra-European 
invol vements and exposure to the demographically unstable areas to the 
south that are bound to be NATO's growing preoccupation. 
Aside from the newly formed Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, where 
all NATO and PFP members will have an opportunity to regularly discuss 
their military and political concerns with One another, the bilateral treaties 
would help perpetuate Europe's present benign international environment 
by improving its already existing "security architecture". Sueh a diversified 
construction would be better suited to respond to the wide variety of 
challenges the Continent is likely to face in the future than would an ever-
expanding but diluted NATO, whose integrity in its present form should be 
preserved for dealing specil1cally with military emergencies. Such 
emergencies, of limited rather than cataclysmic nature, are realistically to 
be expected in both Europe and other parts of the world, not so much 
despite as because of the growing multi polarity of the international system. 
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